The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him? by Hillinger, Ingrid Michelsen
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1983
The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him?
Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger
Copyright c 1983 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Hillinger, Ingrid Michelsen, "The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him?" (1983). Faculty Publications. Paper 972.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/972
The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who 
Needs Him? 
By INGRID MICHELSEN HILLINGER * 
Inertia rather than malice was the moving force behind the method 
practiced by Judge Bridlegoose. . who carried mechanical tests to the 
summit of achievement. 
B. Cardozo, The Growth of the 
Law 139 (1924). 
Assume that Buyer purchases a used car from Seller. Three min-
utes after Buyer takes possession, the engine explodes. Seller was not 
guilty of any fraud with respect to the sale nor did he make any express 
promises about the quality of the car. Does Buyer have any recourse 
against Seller? 
The possibility of legal recourse under the Uniform Commercial 
Codel depends on the seller's status. Section 2-314 of the Code pro-
vides that: "[u]nless excluded or modified (section 2-316), a warranty 
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their 
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."2 
Under this section, merchant sellers are deemed to give an implied 
warranty of merchantability; non-merchant sellers are not.3 Therefore, 
* Assistant Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School 
of Law. B.A., 1968, Barnard College; J.D., 1976, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
The author dedicates whatever is good in this Article to her parents, Dr. and Mrs. Jost 
J. Michelsen. She thanks F. Acie Allen and DavidS. Rudiger, research assistants supreme; 
Leigh Fulwood, bluebook queen; Professors Frederick Schauer and Timothy Sullivan, men-
tors; Professors John Levy, Margit Livingston, and Elizabeth Schmidt, support matrix; Della 
Howard, patient typist; and Michael, Daniel, David and Abigail, family who were still there 
when the last footnote was done. 
I. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Uniform Commercial Code ("the 
Code") are to the 1972 Official Text and Comments. For purposes of this Article, "he," 
"him," and "his" refer to both the masculine and feminine gender. 
2. u.c.c. § 2-314(1). 
3. Courts interpret§ 2-314(1) to mean that non-merchant sellers do not give an im-
plied warranty of merchantability. A determination that the seller is not a merchant imme-
diately disposes of any § 2-314 claim. See, e.g., Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice 
Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522 (D.C. Cir. 1971); McGregor v. Dimou, 101 Misc. 2d 756, 422 
N.Y.S.2d 806 (1979); Samson v. Riesing, 62 Wise. 2d 698, 215 N.W.2d 662 (1974). A non-
merchant seller may be liable to a buyer on other theories. See infra notes 6-10 & accompa-
nying text. 
[747] 
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buyers who receive unmerchantable goods from a merchant seller have 
section 2-314 recourse while buyers who receive unmerchantable goods 
from a non-merchant seller do not. Section 2-314(1) requires the buyer 
from a non-merchant seller to pay his promised purchase price even 
when the goods received are suitable only for placement on Lord Ellen-
borough's dunghill.4 
Section 2-314 determines whether the buyer or the seller must suf-
fer the loss occasioned by unmerchantable goods: if the seller is a 
merchant, he assumes the loss; if the seller is not a merchant, the buyer 
assumes the loss. Section 2-314 suggests that a critical connection exists 
between seller status and the rational allocation of loss for defective 
goods. It does not, however, suggest what that critical connection 
might be. 
There seems to be no logical reason for the Code to absolve an 
entire class of sellers from all legal responsibility to deliver merchanta-
ble goods. Other legal doctrines that allocate loss for defective quality 
do not depend upon seller status. A seller, regardless of his status, must 
bear the loss in the event of breach of an express warranty,5 fraud,6 
innocent misrepresentation/ or constructive fraud. 8 In addition, other 
countries, which in many instances do differentiate between merchant 
and non-merchant sellers, do not differentiate between sellers in terms 
of their basic legal obligation to deliver merchantable goods.9 Section 
2-314(l)'s method of allocating loss based upon seller status is both 
puzzling and unusual. 10 
4. Gardiner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (K.B. 1815). 
5. See, e.g., Rock Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Co., 352 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1971); 
Downs v. Shouse, 18 Ariz. App. 225, 501 P.2d 401 (1972). 
6. See, e.g., McGregor v. Dimou, 101 Misc. 2d 756, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1979). 
7. See Fields v. Haupert, 213 Or. 179, 323 P.2d 332 (1958); Dahl v. Crain, 193 Or. 207, 
237 P.2d 939 (1951). Courts allow a buyer to rescind the sale where the seller has made an 
innocent misrepresentation. 
8. The doctrine of constructive fraud requires a special relationship between the par-
ties but otherwise does not focus on the defendant's status. See, e.g., Jackson v. Seymour, 
193 Va. 735, 71 S.E.2d 181 (1952). 
9. In both France and Germany it is the civil code rather than the commercial code 
that imposes a basic duty on all sellers to deliver merchantable goods. For a more detailed 
discussion of the French and German approaches to a seller's responsibility for quality, see 
infra notes 309-20 & accompanying text. 
10. Allocation of loss on the basis of seller status appears to be peculiar to the Anglo-
American legal system. The English recently amended their Sale of Goods Act to impose a 
warranty on any seller who sells goods "in the course of a business." 34 HALSBURY's LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 78 (3d ed. 1960 & Supp. 1982). Previously, the English Sale of Goods Act 
limited the implied warranty of merchantability to sellers dealing in goods of that descrip-
tion. Id. at 78 (3d ed. 1960). In reviewing the warranty provisions in their own Sale of 
Goods Act, the Ontario Law Reform commission objected to the English revision and rec-
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The Code fails to provide any policy statement justifying its sec-
tion 2-314 merchant distinction. Rather, a buyer's section 2-314 fate 
hinges on the Code's difficult and confusing definition of "merchant." 11 
The practical difficulties in determining who qualifies as a merchant for 
purposes of section 2-314 compound the theoretical difficulties created 
by the section's merchant distinction itself. Both difficulties grow more 
acute as courts, by analogy, extend section 2-314's "reasoning" to non-
sales transactions.I2 
This Article seeks to understand and evaluate section 2-314's 
merchant distinction, examining it from a number of perspectives, in-
cluding the Code's warranty provisions, its overall warranty philoso-
phy, and its merchant definition. The Article explores the historical 
connection linking seller status to seller responsibility for quality and 
analyzes the merchant restriction in terms of the public policies under-
lying the creation of an implied warranty of merchantability. The Arti-
cle concludes that section 2-314's merchant distinction is inconsistent 
ommended retention of the former English approach, noting its similarity to the Code's 
approach. ONT. LAW REFORM COMM'N, 1 REPORT ON SALE OF GOODS 209 (1979). 
11. U.C.C. § 2-104(1). The threshold question in a§ 2-314 claim is whether the seller 
qualifies as a merchant. See, e.g., Donald v. City Nat'l Bank of Dothan, 295 Ala. 320,329 
So. 2d 92 (1976); Samson v. Riesing, 62 Wis. 2d 698, 215 N.W.2d 662 (1974). For a discus-
sion of the Code's merchant definition, see i'!fra notes 146-200 & accompanying text. 
12. Technically,§ 2-314limits itself to sales. Some courts have been willing, however, 
to imply a warranty of merchantability in non-sales transactions such as leases, bailments, or 
goods provided in connection with services. See, e.g., Quality Acceptance Corp. v. Million 
& Albers, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 771 (D. Wyo. 1973) (implied warranty applicable to a lease of 
business machines with option to purchase); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970) 
(commenting that bailment arrangements do not preclude an implied warranty of 
merchantability); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968) (im-
plied warranty applicable to ice machine lease having characteristics of a sale); Cintrone v. 
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (implied warranty 
exists in bailor-bailee relationship). 
Courts have refused, however, to extend§ 2-314 to lease transactions in which the lessor 
has acted merely to finance the transaction. See, e.g., All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 
Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177 (1975); All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 
899 (1979). Section 2-314's express reference to sales also has caused some courts to refuse 
to recognize an implied warranty of merchantability in a service transaction even though 
goods were also provided to the recipient of the services. See, e.g., Gunter v. Cascio, 335 ill. 
App. 287, 81 N.E.2d 766 (1948) (dental services); O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 
253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1977) (sale involved not only transfer of goods but also installation); 
Preston v. Thompson, 53 N.C. App. 290, 280 S.E.2d 780 (1981) (dentist not a merchant); 
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (blood transfusion by 
. a hospital is a service not a sale). Professor Farnsworth, among others, argues that an im-
plied warranty of merchantability should not hinge on a sale/service distinction. Farns-
worth, Implied Wa"anlies of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 51 CoLUM. L. REv. 653, 666 
(1957). See also R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES § 80 (1970); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-6, at 398 (2d ed. 1980). 
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with the Code's overall warranty scheme and philosophy as well as 
with modern notions of unjust enrichment. 13 It is not a product of con-
sidered reasoning, but an atavistic remnant of our caveat emptor past 
and should be eliminated. 
Section 2-314's Merchant Distinction From The Perspective Of 
The Code's Three Warranty Provisions 
Section 2-314 is one of three Code provisions dealing with a 
seller's responsibility for the quality of the goods he sells. 14 Of the 
three, only section 2-314 statutorily links seller status to seller responsi-
bility for quality. A consideration of the three warranty provisions 
may explain why only merchant sellers assume section 2-314 implied 
warranty responsibility. 
Section 2-313 
Section 2-313 deals with express warranties, which can be created 
by a variety of means. 15 Any affirmation of fact or promise made by 
the seller, any description of the goods, or any model or sample creates 
an express warranty of quality with respect to the goods !f the affirma-
tion, promise, description, model, or sample is made "part of the basis 
of the bargain." 16 Although the phrase "part of the basis of the bar-
gain" is vague, 17 comment 1 to section 2-313 explains that "express 
13. "The principle ... is to deprive the defendant of benefits that in equity and good 
conscience he ought not to keep, even though he may have received those benefits quite 
honestly in the first instance, and even though the plaintiff may have suffered no demonstra-
ble losses." D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 224 (1973). In a non-
merchant sale involving defective goods assumed to be non-defective, the seller gains while 
the buyer, by having to pay the purchase price, suffers a demonstrable loss. 
14. Section 2-314 deals with the implied warranty of merchantability,§ 2-313 with ex-
press warranties, and § 2-315 with the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 
15. U.C.C. § 2-313, captioned "Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Descrip-
tion, Sample," provides: "(l) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: (a) Any 
affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the affirmation or promise. (b) Any description of the goods which is made part 
of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
description. (c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates 
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model. (2) It 
is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such 
as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an 
affirmation merely of the value of goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's 
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty." 
16. /d. 
17. The phrase and its possible significance in the overall scheme of§ 2-313 have re-
ceived considerable scholarly attention. See, e.g.! R. NORDSTROM, supra note 12, §§ 66-68; 
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warranties rest on 'dickered aspects' of the individual bargain and go 
... clearly to the essence of that bargain,"18 thus focusing on the ar-
ticulated quality terms of a bargain.19 Section 2-313 gives legal effect to 
the responsibilities for quality which a seller expressly undertakes, 
thereby protecting the buyer's reasonable expectations of quality cre-
ated by overt seller conduct. 
The text of section 2-313 makes no distinction as to seller status. 
Any seller can give an express warranty. Seller status, however, is not 
wholly irrelevant to section 2-313, and may play a role in determining 
whether an express warranty was given. Section 2-313(2) recognizes 
that some seller statements may represent the seller's opinion of quality 
as opposed to an express promise of quality.2° Comment 8 to section 2-
313, which gives courts guidance in determining whether a particular 
statement constitutes mere opinion or an express warranty, provides 
the standard governing all section 2-313 claims: "the basic question 
remains the same: what statements of the seller have in the circum-
stances and in objective judgment become part of the basis of the 
bargain?"2 I 
A seller's status may influence the court's interpretation of the par-
ties' objectively reasonable understanding. One court held that the 
statement "[t]he car is in good shape" did not constitute an express 
warranty when spoken by a private individual with no special knowl-
edge or expertise regarding cars, and that a reasonable buyer could not 
understand the statement to be an express warranty.22 A comparable 
statement, when made by a used car dealer, has been held to constitute 
an express warranty.23 Under section 2-313, then, seller status may be 
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, mpra note 12, § 9-4; E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, COMMER-
CIAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 523-25 (3d ed. 1976); Comment, "Basis of the Bargain"-
What Role Reliance?, 34 U. PITT. L. REv. 145 (1972). 
18. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 1. 
19. Lyrically put, "[e]xpress warranties are chisels in the hands of buyers and sellers. 
With these tools, the parties to a sale sculpt a monument representing the goods. Having 
selected a stone, the buyer and seller may leave it almost bare, allowing considerable play in 
the qualities that fit its contours. Or the parties may chisel away inexactitudes until a well-
defined shape emerges." Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transac-
tions, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 30, 43 (1978). 
20. "[A]n affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be 
merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a[n] [express) 
warranty." U.C.C. § 2-313(2). 
21. Id. comment 8. 
22. Guess v. Lorenz, 612 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
23. Wat Henry Pontiac Co. v. Bradley, 202 Okla. 82, 210 P.2d 348 (1949) (used car 
salesman's statement that the car was in "A-1 shape" and "mechanically perfect" held to 
constitute an express warranty). Professors White and Summers believe that this case is 
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a factor in determining whether an express warranty has been given, 
but it is not dispositive. 
Section 2-315 
Section 2-315 deals with the seller's implied undertaking to pro-
vide goods fit for the buyer's particular purpose.24 According to section 
2-315, if the seller has reason to know ofthe buyer's particular purpose 
and of the buyer's reliance on the seller's expertise in furnishing goods 
for that particular purpose, the sale alone obligates the seller to provide 
goods fit for the buyer's purpose.25 Comment 1 to section 2-315 states 
that "[w]hether or not this warranty arises in any individual case is 
basically a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances of 
the contracting."26 This suggests that section 2-315 protects the buyer's 
reasonable, albeit unarticulated, expectations of quality which are cre-
ated by the circumstances of the transaction rather than the kind of 
overt seller conduct described in section 2-313. The seller's mere act of 
sale creates a reasonable expectation in the buyer that the goods will 
meet his particular purpose.27 
distinguishable from other "puffing" cases because it involved a woman with a seven-
month-old child buying a car in 1944 to make a trip to visit her husband who was in the 
Army. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 9-3. See a/so D. WHALEY, WARRANTIES 
AND THE PRACTITIONER 33 {1981). 
24. U.C.C. § 2-315, captioned "Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose," 
provides in full: "where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particu-
lar purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill 
or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under 
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose." 
25. The seller's sale under the circumstances described in § 2-315 impliedly establishes 
the seller's assumption of responsibility to provide goods suitable for the buyer's known 
purpose. 
26. Id. comment l. 
27. The case law involving§ 2-315 suggests that it protects the buyer's reasonable ex-
pectations arising from the circumstances of the sale. For instance, the seller who was told 
that the exterior walls of buyer's stucco home were "chalky" and was asked to recommend a 
paint to cover the walls was liable for breach of warranty when the paint he sold did not 
adhere to the stucco walls. Catania v. Brown, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 344, 231 A.2d 668 (1967). See 
a/so J. Landau & Co. v. L-Co Cabinet Corp., 46 NORTHUMBERLAND LEG. J. 31, 14 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1132 (1974); Caldwell v. Brown Funeral Serv. Home, 345 So. 2d 
1341 (Ala. 1977). On the other hand, if the seller does not know of the buyer's particular 
purpose, then the buyer cannot reasonably expect the seller to provide goods suitable for 
that purpose. Thus, the seller who supplied laminated sheetrock in response to the buyer's 
order for one-inch sheetrock was not liable to the buyer under§ 2-315 because he did not 
know of the buyer's particular purpose which required homogeneous sheetrock. Tracor, Inc. 
v. Austin Supply & Drywall Co., Inc., 484 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). See also 
Standard Packaging Corp. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 259 F. Supp. 919, 921-22 (E.D. 
Pa. 1966). 
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Section 2-315 does not limit itself to merchant sellers. Although 
the comments to section 2-315 note that normally only merchant sellers 
would give this warranty because only they would possess the requisite 
skill and expertise, the comments recognize that under the appropriate 
circumstances a non-merchant seller could give a section 2-315 war-
ranty as well. 28 
Failure to restrict the class of sellers capable of giving either an 
express or an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose sug-
gests that the drafters did not want to create arbitrary classifications 
that might deny effect to a buyer's reasonable quality expectations in a 
given transaction. Both section 2-313 and section 2-315 protect a 
buyer's reasonable expectations of quality. A seller, merchant or not, 
who disappoints the buyer's section 2-313 or section 2-315 expectations 
of quality is liable to the buyer for breach of warranty. 
Section 2-314 
Section 2-314 discusses the implied warranty of merchantability, 
which involves the seller's legal obligation to deliver goods fit for the 
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.29 Section 2-314(1) 
limits section 2-314 to merchant sellers only.30 Thus, only merchant 
28. U.C.C. § 2-315 comment 4. Skill and expertise with respect to goods can exist in 
those who do not sell such goods regularly. For instance, consider the fellow who builds 
boats for pleasure. His close friend who lives nearby on the ocean asks him to build a boat. 
The seller's agreement to build him a boat would create a reasonable expectation in the 
buyer that he would receive a boat suitable for ocean sailing. 
29. Section 2-314 provides in full: "(1) Unless excluded or modified (sections 2-316), a 
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the 
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for 
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (a) pass without objection in the 
trade under the contract description; and (b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair aver-
age quality within the description; and (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such 
goods are used; and (d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, 
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and (e) are adequately 
contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and (f) conform to the 
promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any. (3) Unless excluded 
or modified (section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or 
usage of trade." 
"Fitness for the ordinary purpose for which goods of the type are used is a fundamental 
concept of the present section .... " U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 8. Courts frequently rely on 
§ 2-314(2)(c) as the basic§ 2-314 quality standard. See, e.g., Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 478, 276 A.2d 807 (1970); Dennin v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 
2d 451, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1974); S.F.C. Acceptance Corp. v. Ferree, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 225, 3 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 808 (1966). 
30. U.C.C. Section 2-314(1) provides that "a warranty that the goods shall be mer-
chantable is implied ... if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." 
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sellers are obligated to deliver goods of merchantable quality. Section 
2-314 makes the obligation to deliver merchantable goods an implied 
term in all merchant seller contracts unless excluded or modified. 31 
Subsection (2) of section 2-314 attempts to give substantive mean-
ing to the implied obligation established in subsection (1) by setting 
forth six conjunctive standards for determining merchantability.32 The 
standards, intentionally broad and vague, enable section 2-314 to apply 
to the infinite variety of goods and sales circumstances governed by 
article 2. 33 
These broad standards require the courts to determine any indi-
vidual seller's section 2-314 quality undertaking. In doing so, courts 
will consider the nature of the particular goods, 34 the contract price, 35 
the circumstances surrounding the sale,36 common expectations and ex-
31. u.c.c. § 2-314(2). 
32. See supra note 29 for the text ofU.C.C. § 2-314(2). The concept of"merchantable" 
or "merchantability" pre-dates the Code. See infra notes 176-81 & accompanying text. 
33. Article 2 applies to all transactions in goods unless the context indicates otherwise, 
the transaction in reality is a security transaction, or a separate statute exists regulating sales 
to consumers, farmers or other special classes of buyers. U. C. C. § 2-102. Article 2 governs 
transactions in goods as diverse as wigets, Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., Inc., 402 
F. Supp. 1017 (D. Conn. 1975); electricity, Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison 
Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972); day old chickens, Vlases v. Montgomery 
Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967); and race horses, Calloway v. Manion, 572 F.2d 
1033 (5th Cir. 1978). It also covers used goods. Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern 
Airways Co., 125 Ga. App. 404, 188 S.E.2d 108 (1972) (used airplane); Regan Purchase & 
Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1972) (auction of restaurant 
equipment); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 
(1976) (used car). But see Chag Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. 
1973) (§ 2-314 not applicable to used goods). For a discussion of this case and its unique 
interpretation of § 2-314's non-applicability to used goods, see Comment, UCC Implied 
Warranty of Merchantability and Used Goods, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 630 (1974). For a more 
general discussion of the warranty as it applies to used goods, see Comment, Used Goods and 
Merchantability, 13 TULSA L.J. 627 (1978). "Goods" includes "all things (including spe-
cially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract 
for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 
8) and things in action." U.C.C. § 2-105. 
34. See, e.g., Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 424 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981) (product's experimental and "new" nature was found to 
preclude imposition of an implied warranty of merchantability). Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. 
Supp. 760, 770 (E.D. Pa. 1977), o/f'd, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978); Coffer v. Standard 
Brands, 30 N.C. App. 134, 139, 226 S.E.2d 534,537 (1976); Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 130 
Vt. 512, 516, 296 A.2d 269, 272 (1972). 
35. See, e.g., Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1972); Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W.Va. 818, 156 
S.E.2d 1 (1967). 
36. See, e.g., Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691, 696-97 (N.D. 1976); Perry v. 
Lawson Ford Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458, 463 (Okla. 1980). 
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perience,37 trade usage,3s and the nature of the defect.39 The courts, 
and not the Code, ultimately determine what responsibilities for quali-
ty are engendered by the implied warranty of merchantability.40 The 
courts decide what is and what is not merchantable. 
The Theory of Section 2-314 
Contrasting express with implied warranties, comment 1 to section 
2-313 states: " '[i]mplied' warranties rest so clearly on a common fac-
tual situation or set of conditions that no particular language or action 
is necessary to evidence them and they will arise in such a situation 
unless unmistakably negated."41 This suggests that sections 2-314 and 
37. See, e.g., Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309 
(1964); Kelly v. Hanscom Bros. Inc., 231 Pa. Super. 357, 361, 331 A.2d 737, 739 (1974) (the 
court considered children's "universal" penchant for putting things in their mouths in deter-
mining whether toys were merchantable). 
38. See, e.g., T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338,351-53 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Brickman-Joy Corp. v. National Annealing Box Co., 459 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1972); 
Spurgeon v. Jamieson Motors, 164 Mont. 296, 301-02, 521 P.2d 924, 927 (1974) (the court 
considered trade usage in determining whether the§ 2-314 implied warranty had been mod-
ified by the parties and was therefore inapplicable). 
39. See, e.g., Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Musil v. 
Hendrick, 6 Kan. App. 2d 196, 627 P.2d 367 (1981); Anderson v. Associated Grocers, Inc., 11 
Wash. App. 774, 525 P.2d 284 (1974). • 
40. A seller's § 2-314 responsibility will vary considerably depending upon the circum-
stances. With respect to a new motor coach, for instance, the court in Massingale v. North-
west Cortez, Inc., 27 Wash. App. 749, 620 P.2d 1009 (1980), held that§ 2-314 obligated the 
seller to deliver an object "fit to transport the driver and his passengers reasonably safely, 
efficiently and comfortably." I d. at 752, 620 P.2d at 1011. With respect to a used car, "mer-
chantable" required a car that would not bum itself into oblivion three hours after its 
purchase. Rose v. Epley Motor Sales, 288 N.C. 53, 215 S.E.2d 573 (1975). With regard to 
polio vaccine, "merchantable" entailed a product that would not actively cause the very 
disease it was designed to protect. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 
620, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 44 P.2d 447 (1960). In determining that agricultural fertilizer must 
cause "something to happen" in order to be merchantable, the judge in American Fertilizer 
Specialists, Inc. v. Wood, 635 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1981) relied on common sense and his own 
personal experience: "I think when you hire someone to do something and it is not done or 
the results do not come about as forecast, be it breach of implied warranty or be it no 
fertilizer was put down, that you have violated the person's right. . . . I grew up on a farm 
and we applied fertilizer and got results every time, one way or the other." Id. at 597. 
Certainly this court's handling of the implied warranty issue confirms that: "Experience has 
been not only the life of the law, but the progenitor of implied warranties. The idea of 
imposing warranties of quality by law was probably conceived in the experience of the un-
fortunate who bought the unfit from the unscrupulous." Special Project, supra note 19, at 
67. In contrast, a "merchantable" used ice making machine was held to include one that did 
not make ice. Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 
490 (1972). Also, with respect to a $25,000 race horse, "merchantable" included a horse 
which won only a little over $1300 and incurred medical expenses in excess of$9000. Sessa 
v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977). · 
41. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 1. 
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2-315 give legal effect to the parties' unarticulated contractual under-
standings with respect to quality.42 Both provisions infer what the par-
ties failed to articulate because it was so basic to their understanding as 
not to require expression.43 
Analyzing the implied warranty of merchantability cases up to 
1943, Dean Prosser argued that a theory of "implied agreement in fact" 
explained most of the decisions.44 Under this theory, 
[t]he warranty has in fact been agreed upon by the parties as an un-
expressed term of the contract of sale. . . . The court, by interpret-
ing the language used, the conduct of the parties and the 
circumstances of the case, finds that it is there. Such a contract term 
"implied in fact" differs from an express agreement only in that it is 
circumstantially proved.45 
Comment 7 to section 2-314 suggests that the Code's implied warranty 
of merchantability provision also relates to the parties' actual, reason-
able contractual understandings and intentions: "[i]n cases of doubt as 
to what quality is intended, the price at which a merchant closes a con-
tract is an excellent index of the nature and scope of his obligation 
under the present section."46 Section 2-314 seems to embody Dean 
Prosser's "implied in fact" contract theory.47 Interpreted this way, sec-
tion 2-314 deals with the impliedly understood quality terms of a bar-
gain, protecting the buyer's reasonably entertained quality 
expectations. The view that the implied warranty of merchantability 
42. Section 1-201(3) defines "agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found 
in their language or by implication from other circumstances .... " U.C.C. § 1-201. Sec-
tions 2-314 and § 2-315 dealing with implied warranties establish certain circumstances 
which relate to the parties' bargain in fact. 
43. One court held with respect to the sale of a new car ''the presumption is that the 
dealer intended to deliver and the buyer intended to receive a reasonably safe, efficient and 
comfortable car." Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 187, 484 P.2d 380, 383 (1971). 
44. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 125 
(1943). 
45. Id. at 123. 
46. U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 7. 
47. Dean Prosser suggested another theory to explain the implied warranty of 
merchantability that it is imposed by law. Prosser, supra note 42, at 124. Some courts 
agreed, noting that implied warranties represent an obligation imposed by law as a matter of 
public policy. See,e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501, 504 (lOth Cir. 1959). 
Professor Whaley suggests an intermediary interpretation: "implied warranties depend on 
legislative policy ... they reflect society's judgments about the basic understandings of the 
foundation of most deals: implied warranties are contractual only in the sense that they 
mirror common expectations .... " D. WHALEY,supra note 23, at 21-22. To the extent that 
the parties' actual expectations reflect common expectations, § 2-314 enforces both an obli-
gation implied-in-fact and imposed by law. The implied warranty has been described as "a 
contractual term promising quality but imposed by law rather than agreement." Special 
Project, supra note 22, at 68. 
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protects the buyer's reasonable, unarticulated quality expectations finds 
support in the comments to section 2-314,48 judicial interpretations of 
that section,49 and Dean Prosser's comments.50 The warranty protects 
these expectations by giving the buyer legal recourse against his seller 
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 5 1 
Ifthe purpose of section 2-314 is the protection of the buyer's rea-
sonable unarticulated expectations under the circumstances, one won-
ders what purpose section 2-314's merchant distinction serves. If the 
idea is that those who buy from non-merchant sellers cannot have rea-
sonable quality expectations, section 2-314's merchant restriction is su-
perfluous. Section 2-314 does not need a merchant restriction to deny 
effect to unreasonable quality expectations. Suppose, for example, that 
a person sells a neighbor a used washing machine. Three days after the 
purchase the motor dies, necessitating the purchase of a new motor. 
Even without a merchant restriction, the buyer could not sue the seller 
successfully under section 2-314. The buyer, as a reasonable person 
buying a used washing machine, reasonably would assume and expect 
that the subject matter of the sale might require repair, even extensive 
repair, to be serviceable. The fact that it needed repair would not make 
it unmerchantable. Delivery of a machine which required repair would 
still conform to the parties' impliedly understood bargain and the 
seller's section 2-314 quality responsibility would be met. Similarly, 
the manufacturer who buys a used machine from another manufactur-
ing concern can reasonably expect that the machine might experience 
the typical infirmities of old age that a new machine would not. 52 Sec-
tion 2-314's merchant distinction is not necessary to block enforcement 
of unreasonable quality expectations. 
In addition to being superfluous to the goal of protecting a buyer's 
reasonable expectations, section 2-314's merchant distinction totally 
obstructs that objective with respect to non-merchant sales by categori-
cally precluding the court from inquiring into the buyer's implied qual-
ity expectations in a non-merchant sale. If the policy behind section 2-
314 is to give effect to a buyer's reasonable quality expectations, we 
48. See supra notes 41, 46 & accompanying text. 
49. See supra notes 34-40 & accompanying text. 
SO. See supra notes 44-45 & accompanying text. 
51. A seller's breach of warranty authorizes the buyer to reject the goods. U.C.C_. § 2-
601. In the event of acceptance, the buyer may revoke his acceptance if the non-conformity 
substantially impairs the value of the goods to him. U.C.C. § 2-608. In the event that revo-
cation is not authorized, the buyer may sue the seller for damages. U.C.C. § 2-714. 
52. Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 
(Civ. Ct. 1972) (used ice-making machine that did not make ice was merchantable). 
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must look elsewhere to explain why those expectations should not be 
protected when the seller is not a merchant. 
Section 2-314's Merchant Distinction From The Perspective Of 
The Code's Overall Warranty Philosophy 
Although a reasonable expectations theory of section 2-314 does 
not explain the merchant distinction, an examination of the Code's 
overall warranty philosophy may. Buried in a comment to section 2-
313 is the the statement that "the whole purpose of warranty law is to 
determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell .... " 53 
That statement suggests that the warranty provisions54 all seek a com-
mon goal: determination of the seller's essential contractual undertak-
ing.55 That undertaking can have implied as well as express 
components. 
If the whole purpose of warranty law is determining the seller's 
essential agreement, and all the warranty provisions are just ways to 
determine that agreement, section 2-314's merchant distinction oper-
53. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4. 
54. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315, and 2-316 (Exclusion and Modification of Warran-
ties). See supra notes IS, 31, 37 and infra notes 125-40 & accompanying text. 
55. Section 2-316 recognizes the exclusion or modification of warranties if it reflects the 
parties' bargain. Its requirements seek to protect a buyer from surprise. U.C.C. § 2-316 
comment I. Obviously exclusions and modifications relate to the seller's essential contrac-
tual undertaking and therefore are an essential part of the Code's overall warranty scheme. 
Some courts, especially in the area of consumer transactions, have been both willing and 
adept at invalidating disclaimer clauses. See, e.g., Duckworm v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. 
Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 337, 120 Cal. Rptr. 
681 (1975). Other courts have been less willing to do so. See, e.g. ,Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. 
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 454 F. Supp. 537 (D.C. Mass. 1977); Hahn v. Ford Motor 
Co., 434 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. App. 1982). 
For a discussion of the various, artful means courts have used to avoid disclaimer 
clauses, see Sullivan, Innovation in the Law o/ Warranty: The Burden o/ Reform, 32 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 341, 377-89 (1980). Senator Warren Magnuson argued that consumers needed 
protection from sellers who gave a limited express warranty and disclaimed all implied war-
ranties. Magnuson, Fair Disclosure In the Marketplace o/ Warranty Promises-Truth in War-
ranties for Consumers, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 117, 124 (1975). This typical seller conduct, in part, 
justified enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. !d. Professor Sullivan ques-
tioned the overwhelming need for federal legislation in the face of common law develop-
ments. Sullivan, supra, at 401. 
Scholars have noted the artificiality of the Code's warranty treatment. See, e.g. , Rabel, 
The Hague Conference on the Un(fication of Sales Law, I AM. J. COMP. L. 58, 61 (1952); D. 
WHALEY, supra note 23, at 21. The proposed warranty provision for the International Sales 
Law provided simply that "the seller is obliged to deliver goods which possess the qualities 
and characteristics expressly or impliedly contemplated by the contract." Honnold, A Uni-
form Law for International Sales, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 299,314-15 (1959). Professor Honnold 
said that "these few words provide a basis for a unified, powerful and realistic approach to a 
solution to the most pervasive problem of sales law." !d. 
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ates as the erring black sheep in the Code's warranty family. Rather 
than advancing the Code's purpose of determining the seller's essential 
undertaking, the merchant distinction does just the opposite. In the 
area of non-merchant sales, the court cannot use section 2-314 to deter-
mine what the seller has in essence agreed to sell, thereby eliminating a 
valuable tool otherwise available to the court. The distinction seems at 
odds with the Code's overall warranty philosophy. 
In this regard, section 2-314's merchant distinction becomes even 
more puzzling when considered in conjunction with section 2-315. As 
previously mentioned,56 the section 2-315 implied warranty is not re-
stricted to any particular class of sellers. Section 2-315 establishes that 
non-merchant sellers can undertake some implied contractual responsi-
bilities. The juxtaposition of sections 2-314 and 2-315 produces a most 
curious denouement. A non-merchant seller can agree impliedly to 
furnish goods suitable for the buyer's particular purpose, but cannot 
agree impliedly to furnish goods suitable for their ordinary purpose. In 
addition to the general question of why non-merchant sellers can im-
pliedly assume some responsibilities but not others, there is the nar-
rower question of whether the ordinary purpose for which goods are 
used is subsumed under the buyer's particular purpose. One comment 
to section 2-315 discusses shoes: "shoes are generally used for the pur-
pose ofwalking upon ordinary ground .... " 57 If the seller knows that 
the buyer wants mountain climbing shoes and the buyer relies on the 
seller's expertise to select shoes suitable for that purpose, the seller in 
selling a particular pair of shoes to the buyer has impliedly undertaken 
to provide shoes that will be adequate for mountain climbing. 58 It 
would seem that the implied undertaking to provide shoes capable of 
withstanding the rocky hazards of mountain climbing would include 
the lesser obligation of providing shoes capable of withstanding normal 
street wear. Although a buyer's particular purpose may not involve the 
ordinary purpose for which such goods are used, certainly there is some 
degree of overlap. 59 This overlap of section 2-314 and 2-315 undertak-
ings produces an incongruous situation with respect to non-merchant 
sales. What the non-merchant seller cannot undertake impliedly in 
section 2-314, he can undertake in section 2-315-and more. 
56. See supra note 34 & accompanying text. 
57. U.C.C. § 2-315 comment 2. 
58. Id. 
59. Some courts have found both implied warranties to have been breached by a seller. 
See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961); Thomas v. Ford Motor 
Credit Co., 48 Md. App. 617,429 A.2d 277 (1981); Shaffer v. Victoria Station Inc., 91 Wash. 
2d 295, 588 P.2d 233 (1978). This can occur only if the seller is a merchant. 
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This incongruity becomes odder still in light of case law suggesting 
that the ordinary purpose for goods can constitute a buyer's particular 
purpose.6° Food and clothing best exemplify the occasionally in-
terchangable nature of ordinary and particular purpose. Normally one 
buys food to eat and clothing to wear. The ordinary purpose for food is 
consumption; for clothing, bodily decor. In addition, sellers of food 
and clothing can know, with little outside help, that their buyers are 
buying food and clothing for the particular purpose of eating and wear-
ing.6I Assume the buyer buys contaminated sausage. In a non-
merchant sales transaction, he cannot use section 2-314 to argue that 
the goods are not merchantable, i.e., not fit for their ordinary pur-
pose-eating-but he can argue, under section 2-315, that they are not 
fit for his particular purpose-eating. In this instance, the buyer's pur-
60. Professor Williston noted that "[f]itness for a particular purpose may be merely the 
equivalent of merchantability. Thus the particular purpose for which a reaping machine is 
generally designed is reaping . . . . The particular purpose, however, may be narrower; a 
reaping machine may be desired for operation on rough ground and, though it may be a 
good reaping machine, it may yet be impossible to make it work satisfactorily in the place 
where the buyer wishes to use it." S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES§ 235 (1st ed. 1909). 
The text of§ 2-315 itself does not restrict the particular purpose to one different from 
the ordinary purpose. U.C.C. § 2-315. Comment 2, however, suggests that the particular 
purpose differs from the ordinary purpose "in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer 
which is peculiar to the nature of his business .... " U.C.C. § 2-315 comment 2. The com-
mentary seems questionable. It probably arose because the drafters assumed that § 2-314 
would insure fitness for the ordinary purpose while § 2-315 would impose a greater degree 
of quality responsibility if the requisite circumstances existed. See supra notes 24-27 & ac-
companying text. This will not always be the case. Section 2-315 could apply when § 2-314 
would not. For a general discussion of the interrelationship between§§ 2-314 and 2-315, see 
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 9-9. For pre-Code cases blurring the purposes 
involved in the two warranties see, e.g., Grant Mfg. Co. v. Yates-American Mach. Co., Ill 
F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1940); Country Club Soda Co., Inc. v. Arbuckle, 279 Mass. 121, 181 N.E. 
256 (1932). For post-Code cases see, e.g., Wilson v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 630 F.2d 575 (8th 
Cir. 1980); Thomas v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 48 Md. App. 617, 429 A.2d 277; Clinton 
Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Miss. 1977). Of course,§ 2-
315 requires buyer reliance on the seller's skill and judgment and courts frequently dismiss a 
§ 2-315 claim because the requisite reliance is absent. See, e.g., Garner v. S & S Livestock 
Dealers, Inc., 248 So. 2d 783 (Miss. 1971); Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 
19 (1944). Some courts interpret § 2-315 to require a special purpose different from the 
ordinary purpose. See, e.g., McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271 (D.S.C. 1974); Bickett v. 
W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972). 
61. In Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), for instance, the plaintiff, 
a non-buyer consumer of a hula skirt, sued the owners of the gift shop from which the skirt 
had been bought after it caught fire, burning more than 75% of her body. The court said 
that both implied warranties were identical: they related to fitness for use as an article of 
clothing. !d. at 94. If an individual buys a car which does not run, both warranties also are 
breached because it is not of fair average quality or fit for the purpose as impliedly made 
known to the seller. Thomas v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 48 Md. App. 617, 429 A.2d 277 
(1981). 
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pose and the seller's essential undertaking remain constant but the 
Code authorizes recourse only under section 2-315. 
Interpreted in light of section 2-315, section 2-314 appears to sug-
gest that non-merchant sellers cannot impliedly agree to deliver mer-
chantable goods. The Code does not explain why they cannot, nor 
does it explain why they can agree impliedly to deliver goods fit for a 
buyer's particular purpose. Furthermore, it does not explain why, in 
the context of a non-merchant sale, the nature of the goods, their con-
tract price, the circumstances surrounding the sale, the common expec-
tations and common experience and the nature of the defect, are not 
significant indicia of the nature and scope of the seller's undertak.ing.62 
Considerations perfectly valid when made in"the context of a merchant 
sale suddenly become invalid. Evidently, when the seller is not a 
merchant, the price at which a deal is closed does not operate as "an 
excellent index of the nature and scope of [the seller's] 
obligation. . . ."63 
The drafters' own words indicate that the aim of all warranty law 
is to determine what, in essence, the seller has agreed to sell. 64 The 
warranties capture the parties' actual objective contractual understand-
ing from the words and circumstances of the transaction.65 But section 
2-314 seems to suggest that, as a matter of law, a non-merchant seller 
and buyer cannot impliedly agree, contemplate or intend that the goods 
will be merchantable or fit for their ordinary purpose. It is highly un-
likely that the drafters of the Code subscribed to such a blanket as-
sumption about actual contractual understandings. The drafters, led 
by Professor Karl Llewellyn, 66 wer~ hard-core realists67 who believed 
62. See supra notes 34-39 & accompanying text (indicating the relevance of these con-
siderations to a seller's quality undertaking if a merchant seller is involved). 
63. U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 7. 
64. Id. § 2-313 comment 4. 
65. Professor Whaley argues that the true test behind§ 2-314 is ''the reasonable expec-
tation of the buyer, holding the seller to a quality level sufficient to protect the average 
buyer." D. WHALEY, supra note 23, at 55. In another section, he argues that "the Code 
protects the reasonable expectations of the buyer measured objectively from the point of 
view of a reasonable person." I d. at 24. Professor Nordstrom argues that in interpreting the 
parties' agreement, the courts should be guided by ''the purpose of contract law-the en-
forcement of the justified expectations of the parties." R. NoRDSTROM, supra note 12, § 46 
n.24. Others agree that § 2-314 seeks to protect a buyer's objectively reasonable exp~cta­
tions. See, e.g., Dolan, The Merchant Class of Article 2: Farmers, .Doctors, and Others, 1977 
. WASH. U.L.Q. 1, l-2, 25; Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 669-70; Newell, The Merchant of 
Article 2, 7 VAL. U.L. REv. 307, 323 (1973). 
66. Professor Karl Llewellyn was the chief reporter for the Code project. According to 
one report, ''there was no difficulty in finding a 'Chief Reporter.' The outstanding man in 
the United States to undertake this task was Professor Karl N. Llewellyn of the Columbia 
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that the operative facts, and nothing else, counted.68 Surely they could 
conceive of a set of operative facts which would establish an implied 
understanding between the parties that the goods were to be fit for their 
ordinary purpose. Suppose Joseph Seller wants to sell his one-year-old 
car because he is going to the Left Bank to write the great American 
novel. He has driven it only 5,000 miles and has experienced no 
problems. Louise Buyer is interested and test drives it. Everything 
seems to be fine. Buyer and Seller negotiate a fair price for the car 
which factors in its bluebook value and the savings afforded to both by 
the private sale. The seller makes no express warranties. It is at least 
arguable that both parties to the sale assumed, intended, and contem-
plated, albeit impliedly, that the car would have the capacity for self-
University Law School." Schnader,A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 4 (1967). One scholar went so far as to 
describe the Code as lex Llewellyn. Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330, 333 (1951). Professor Llewellyn's influence was 
all-pervasive. Professor Soia Mentschikoff (Associate Reporter for the Code project and 
Karl Llewellyn's wife) observed that "[d]espite the numbers of persons involved in the draft-
ing of the Code, the extent to which it reflects Llewellyn's philosophy of law and sense of 
commercial wisdom and need is startling." S. MENTSCHIKOFF, COMMERCIAL TRANSAC-
TIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (1970). 
67. The term "realist" is used to describe the jurisprudential approach which focuses 
on the particular facts of a transaction and rejects the "Langdellian way of achieving doctri-
nal unity on the level of case law or restatement as absurd." G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF 
AMERICAN LAW 79 (1977). According to Professor Gilmore, "Llewellyn ... insisted 
throughout his life that there had never been a Realist 'school' or a Realist 'movement.' " 
/d. at 78. Professor Gilmore interprets Professor Llewellyn's denial as referring to the law 
review controversy and not to Professor Llewellyn's rejection of the Langdellian approach. 
/d. at 78-79. In commenting upon Professor Llewellyn, Professor Gilmore stated: "It was, I 
believe, Karl's non-systematic, particularizing cast of mind and his case-law orientation 
which gave to the statutes he drafted, and particularly the Code, their profound originality. 
He was a remarkable draftsman and took a never-failing interest in even the minutiae of the 
trade. His instinct appeared to be to draft in a loose, open-ended style; his preferred solu-
tions turned on questions of fact (reasonableness, good faith, usage of trade) rather than on 
rules of law." Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 Yale L.J. 813, 814 (1962). 
Professor Corbin's description of Professor Llewellyn's drafting approach reflects this 
author's sense of the term "realist". Many argue that Professor Llewellyn's approach is best 
exemplified by his drafting of sales rules unencumbered by the unitary title concept which 
pervaded pre-Code sales law. See, e.g., R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACATIONS 279-80 (2d ed. 1977); E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, supra 
note 17, at 478; Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales: Should It Be Enacted, 59 
YALE L.J. 821, 824-27 (1950); King, The New Conceptualism of the UCC, 10 ST. LOUIS 
U.L.J. 30, 81 (1965). 
68. In an exhortation to her students, Professor Mentschikoff stated that "each section 
. . . contains a statement of the factual conditions which are the operative conditions on 
which the result stated in the rule rests. This means that in terms of applying or using the 
rule, the very first inquiry will be what are the factual conditions which will put it into 
operation?" S. MENTSCHIKOFF, supra note 66, at 7-8. See a/so R. BRAUCHER & R. 
RIEGERT, supra note 67, at 5-6; King, supra note 67, at 50. 
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propulsion. Typically, a car buyer is interested in acquiring something 
that is driveable. It would not be unreasonable to expect that a one-
year-old car with only 5,000 miles on it would run properly. The seller 
could understand the buyer's implied assumptions and intentions with 
respect to the sale. Moreover, the seller also may be assuming that he is 
selling a car that will drive because he has been driving it. 
Contrary to section 2-314's implication, these parties could under-
stand, intend, and contract impliedly that the car would run. The oper-
ative facts of the transaction, the contract price (bluebook value minus 
savings to both) and the subject matter of the sale (one-year-old car 
with 5,000 miles on it), certainly suggest that Seller assumed he was 
selling and Buyer assumed she was buying a car that would be drive-
able. As comment 1 to section 2-313 suggests, "no p~rticular language 
or action is necessary to evidence" implied warranties. 69 Here, the cir-
cumstances of the sale suggest that the parties had an implied under-
standing with respect to quality. Section 2-314's merchant restriction, 
however, precludes the possibility of recognizing that implied under-
standing and thereby precludes the buyer from section 2-314 recourse 
in the event the implied understanding is not fulfilled. 
The drafters' "realist" predilections make it unlikely that they ex-
empted non-merchant sellers from section 2:-314 coverage because they 
believed that non-merchant sellers and buyers could not contract im-
pliedly for goods fit for their ordinary purpose. In fact, they may have 
excluded non-merchant sellers from section 2-314 coverage because 
they did believe that non-merchant sellers impliedly could undertake 
some responsibility for quality. Sellers giving a section 2-314 implied 
warranty of merchantability are responsible not only for a reduction in, 
or return of, the purchase price, but also for consequential damages. 70 
Perhaps the spectre of consequential liability for non-merchant sellers 
who impliedly undertake to provide merchantable goods produced sec-
tion 2-314's merchant restriction.71 It seems unlikely, however, that the 
69. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 1. 
70. U.C.C. § 2-714(3). For a more detailed discussion of the seller's liability for breach 
of warranty, see infra text accompanying 111-45. 
71. Non-merchant sellers might not insure against liability for defective goods. The 
drafters may have been reluctant to impose substantial liability on those unlikely to insure. 
This would be consonant with the Code's risk-of-loss rule which, in a non-breach situation, 
imposes the risk ofloss on the merchant seller until the buyer's receipt of goods. U.C.C. § 2-
509(3). ''The underlying theory of this rule is that a merchant who is to make physical 
delivery at his own place continues meanwhile to control the goods and can be expected to 
insure his interest in them." U.C.C. § 2-509 comment 3. Imposition of the loss on the party 
more likely to insure provides no help in allocating the loss between two parties, neither of 
whom is likely to insure. See infra notes 302-06 & accompanying text. 
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drafters intended the merchant restriction to mean that non-merchant 
sellers and buyers are incapable of impliedly agreeing to the sale of 
merchantable goods. That conclusion follows neither from the draft-
ers' overall jurisprudential approach nor from a consideration of the 
real world in which people can and do make all kinds of contracts. 
Comment 4 to section 2-313 emphasizes that "consideration 
should be given to the fact that the probability is small that a real price 
is intended to be exchanged for a pseudo-obligation."72 Despite this 
acknowledged low probability, section 2-314 may enforce just such an 
exchange. Rather than enforcing the parties' actual agreement, section 
2-314 has the potential to do quite the opposite in a non-merchant sale. 
It can enforce "agreements" to which the parties never agreed. 
The contract doctrine of fundamental mistake further highlights 
section 2-314's anomalous stance with respect to non-merchant sales. If 
an individual contracts on the basis of a fundamental assumption 
which turns out to be mistaken, he may rescind the contract.73 The law 
authorizes rescission because the contract-in-fact is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the contract supposed.74 It would fly in the face of ortho-
dox contract doctrine75 to give effect to a transaction that the parties 
did not understand or consensually undertake. There is the additional 
concern that enforcement of the ''bargain in fact" would produce an 
uncontemplated and unbargained for enrichment and/or impoverish-
72. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4. 
73. "The disadvantaged party's remedy for mutual mistake is avoidance." E. FARNS-
WORTH, CoNTRACTS§ 9.3 (1982). See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 
(1887); Edwards v. Trinity & Brazos Valley Ry. Co., 54 Tex. Civ. App. 334, 118 S.W. 572 
(1909). Even in situations of unilateral mistake, rescission is available if the non-mistaken 
party has not relied to his detriment. See, e.g. , Elsinore Union Elementary School District 
v. Kastorff, 54 Cal. 2d 380, 353 P.2d 713, 6 Cal. Rptr. I (1960); Boise Junior College Dist. v. 
Mattefs Constr. Co, 92 Idaho 757,450 P.2d 604 (1969). If the mistake is not caused by gross 
negligence, a mistaken party is not barred from relief merely because he could have avoided 
the mistake by the exercise of reasonable care. If the law were otherwise, the availability of 
relief for mistake would be greatly limited." E. FARNSWORTH, supra, § 9.3. See also El-
sinore Union Elementary School Dist. v. Kastorff, 54 Cal. 2d 380, 353 P.2d 713, 6 Cal. Rptr. 
I (1960); Geremia v. Boyarsky, 107 Conn. 387, 140 A. 749 (1928); Edwards v. Trinity & 
Brazos Valley Ry. Co., 54 Tex. Civ. App. 334, 341-43, 118 S.W. 572, 576 (1909). 
74. "Certainly, but for the appellee's belief as to this [sufficient mineable quantity of 
gravel, sand, and clay], it would not have made the contract .... " Edwards v. Trinity & 
Brazos Valley Ry. Co., 54 Tex. Civ. App. 334,344, 118 S.W. 572, 577 (1909). 
75. "An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more 
persons. A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a 
performance or to exchange performances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 
(1979). Whether the agreement between the parties is judged from a subjective or objective 
theory, the existence of an agreement between the parties is necessary to create a contract. 
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ment.76 Although section 1-103 allows the law of mistake to supple-
ment the Code unless the Code displaces the common law,77 section 2-
314 displaces the common law, leaving no room for the doctrine of 
fundamental mistake to operate.78 
If warranties determine what in essence the seller has agreed to 
sell, and section 2-314 seeks to uphold the buyer's reasonable quality 
expectations, it may be possible to rationalize section 2-314's merchant 
distinction as follows:79 the non-merchant seller impliedly agrees only 
to deliver the physical subject matter of the sale, with the buyer im-
pliedly assuming all risks of quality. The purchase price reflects either 
the buyer's assumption of those risks or his innate stupidity. In either 
case, the buyer does not require section 2-314 protection. If the buyer 
pays less for the goods than the going rate for merchantable goods, 
section 2-314 should not operate to give him more than that for which 
he bargained and paid. He paid for physical possession of the goods 
plus the hope that they would be merchantable minus the doubt that 
they would not. In that instance, the contract would represent a con-
scious gamble on the part of both the buyer and the seller, with the 
buyer hoping to buy merchantable goods for less than he would have to 
pay otherwise. The seller would in tum hope to receive more for the 
goods than they were actually worth. Whether the goods tum out to be 
merchantable or unmerchantable, the buyer will have received his bar-
gain and has no need of section 2-314 recourse. On the other hand, if 
the buyer pays a non-merchant seller a price commensurate with mer-
chantable goods, without obtaining the guarantees given by a 
merchant, the buyer is stupid. The law and its prophet, section 2-
314(1), should not reward or encourage such stupidity by affording ave-
nues of relief from its consequences. 
Although this argument has some logical charm, it fails to explain 
76. See, e.g., Elsinore Union Elementary School Dist. v. Kastorff, 54 Cal. 2d 380, 389, 
353 P.2d 713,719,6 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1960) ("bargain" appears too sharp for law and equity to 
sustain); Kenneth E. Curran, Inc. v. State, 106 N.H. 558, 560, 215 A.2d 702, 704 (1965) 
(enforcement of the apparently resulting agreement unconscionable); Edwards v. Trinity & 
Brazos Valley Ry. Co., 54 Tex. Civ. App. 334, 344, 118 S.W. 572, 577 (1909) (enforcement 
would amount to a gift). 
77. u.c.c. § 1-103. 
78. In order for mistake to operate, the parties must have an understanding which is 
mistaken. According to § 2-314(1), the legal possibility of an understanding that the seller 
will deliver merchantable goods does not exist. If it does not exist, it cannot be mistaken. 
For similar reasoning, see Watkins & Son Inc. v. Carrig, 91 N.H. 459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941). 
79. The author wishes to thank Professor Schauer whose insistence that § 2-314(1) 
made sense caused her to rethink and better articulate why§ 2-314's merchant distinction 
makes no sense at all. Professor Schauer has subsequently recanted. 
766 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
section 2-314's merchant distinction. Section 2-314 only protects a 
buyer's reasonable quality expectations, and the buyer who assumes all 
risks of quality has no such expectations. Even without a merchant 
distinction, section 2-314 would not protect that buyer, nor would it 
give effect to a buyer's foolish expectations.80 By definition, foolish ex-
pectations are unreasonable and are unprotected by section 2-314. 
Thus, a non-merchant seller exemption is not necessary to avoid sec-
tion 2-314 enforcement of unreasonable quality expectations. 
It can be argued, however, that even if unnecessary, section 2-314's 
merchant restriction is a handy judicial time-saver. If all non-merchant 
sales involve either a foolish buyer or one who has assumed all risks, 
section 2-314's merchant distinction serves to increase judicial effi-
ciency by precluding litigation involving a preordained result. From a 
practical standpoint, however, the existence of the restriction will not 
eliminate "needless" litigation or litigation with a preordained result. 
With or without a merchant restriction, buyers will continue to sue or 
refuse to pay if they believe that they have not gotten what they 
thought they were getting.81 Nevertheless, a legislative attempt to dis-
courage such litigation may justify section 2-314's merchant restriction, 
but only if one accepts the unrealistic initial assumption that all buyers 
from non-merchant sellers are either stupid or risk-takers. 
Philosophically the drafters opposed blanket assumptions.82 The 
Code expressly and repeatedly directs the court to determine what is 
80. Courts have the ability to distinguish foolish from reasonable expectations. In 
Whitmer v. Schneble v. House of Hoyt, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 3d 659,331 N.E.2d 115 (1975). a 
doberman pinscher bit the child of a friend of the buyers. The friend sued the buyers and 
they, in turn, sued their seller arguing that the seller had expressly warranted that the dog 
was docile. The court suggested that the statement of docility was not an express warranty. 
/d. at 661,331 N.E.2d at 117. It went on to say that even if an express warranty had been 
given, "[e]ven a docile dog is known and expected to bite under certain circumstances." /d. 
at 662, 331 N .E.2d at 118. The court further stated: "the law will not lend itself to the 
creation of an implied warranty which patently runs counter to the experience of mankind 
or known forces of nature." /d. In another case, involving the sale of a race horse, the court 
found the horse to be merchantable saying that "he did not live up to the buyer's hopes for a 
preferred racer but such disappointments are an age-old story in the horse racing business." 
Sessa v. Reigle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 770 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
81. In Guess v. Lorenz, the buyer of a used car with 90,000 miles on it sued the seller for 
breach of express and implied warranties seeking to collect $500 for rear-end work, new car 
tires, a tune-up, and carburetor adjustment. 612 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. App. 1981). The court 
held for the seller observing that the buyer could not expect new car performance, especially 
when the seller had informed the buyer that she had replaced only the carburetor. /d. at 
833-34. See also Donald v. City Nat'l Bank of Dothan, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So. 2d 92 (1976); 
Siemen v. Alden, 34 Ill. App. 3d 961, 341 N.E.2d 713 (1975); Allen v. Nicole, Inc., 172 N.J. 
Super. 442, 412 A.2d 824 (1980). 
82. See supra notes 66-68 & accompanying text. 
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and what is not reasonable.83 A doctrinaire position in section 2-314 
would be quite out of character with the Code as well as with the draft-
ers' basic jurisprudential philosophy. The Code's legislative history 
provides concrete evidence to support this intuition. 
The seeds of article 2 began with a revision of the Uniform Sales 
Act (USA).84 The revision's implied warranty of merchantability pro-
vision, like its modern counterpart, section 2-314, implied a warranty 
that "the goods shall be merchantable in a contract for their sale if the 
seller is a merchant with respect to such goods. . . ."85 The revision 
also contained an introductory provision authorizing judicial flexibility 
83. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-706 (seller's right to resale); 2-712 (buyer's right to cover); 2-
305 (open price term); 2-306 (output, requirement contracts); 2-309 (time of delivery); and 2-
311 (options and cooperation regarding performance). In fact, the Code's repeated refer-
ences to a reasonableness standard prompted Professor Mellinkoff to state that "[t]he word 
'reasonable', effective in small doses, has been administered by the bucket, leaving the 
corpus of the Code reeling in dizzy confusion." Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185, 185-86 (1967). Professor Danzig viewed the drafters' 
reliance on such open-ended terms as a "renunciation of legislative responsibility and 
power," for him an unacceptable delegation of power to the courts. Danzig, A Comment on 
Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 634-35 (1975). 
84. The USA had been drafted by Samuel Williston. S. WILLISTON, supra note 60, at 
iii. The Joint Conference of the American Law Institute and Commissioners for Uniform 
State Laws approved and recommended its adoption in 1906. /d. In 1940, the Conference 
asked Professor Llewellyn to draft a revision. R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, supra note 67, 
at 5. Professor Llewellyn's role as revisor of Professor Williston's work must have created 
some tension between them. This is borne out by a remark made in testimony before the 
New York Law Revision Commission Hearings. One speaker said: "Unfortunately, and 
you might just as well face it, a clash of personalities between Professor Williston and his 
concept of title as being the important thing, and Professor Llewellyn, has arisen." Steno-
graphic Report of Hearing on Article 2 of the Un!form Commercial Code, 1 STATE OF NEw 
YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT: STUDY OF THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE 
155 (1954) (Statement of Mr. J. Francis Ireton, Baltimore, Maryland) [hereinafter cited as 
N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT 1954]. Professor Williston, in 1950, emerged staunchly op-
posed to adoption of the 1949 draft of article 2 because it was iconoclastic. Williston, The 
Law of Sales in the Proposed Un!form Code, 63 HARV. L. REv. 561, 561 (1950). Mr. Schna-
der proposed preparation of a Uniform Commercial Code to the Commissioners as early as 
1940. Schnader, supra note 66, at 1. The Commissioners believed that such an expansive 
undertaking would require the cooperation of the American Law Institute. /d. The final 
agreement between the Institute and Commissioners was executed on December l, 1944. "I d. 
at 5. The revision was then completed. FINAL DRAFT #1 OF UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT 
(1944) [hereinafter cited as FINAL DRAFT #1]. 
85. Section 7 of the 1944 draft, entitled" 'Merchant', 'Between Merchants', 'Financing 
Agency,'" provided: "(1) 'Merchant' means a person who by his occupation holds himself 
out as having the knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the trans-
action or in any particular phase of it, or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed 
by his employment of an agent, broker or any other intermediary having such knowledge or 
skill. With respect to transactions of financing, payment, collection, and the like, a financing 
agency is a 'merchant.'" /d.§ 7. 
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with respect to its special merchant rules.86 Section 1, subsection 3, 
provided: "a provision of this Act which is stated to be applicable 'be-
tween merchants' or otherwise to be of limited application need not be 
so limited when the circumstances and underlying reasons justify ex-
panding its application."87 Professor Llewellyn transposed much of his 
USA revision work into article 2. The 1949 draft of the Code repeated 
verbatim this flexibility directive. 88 
A battle ensued over retention of this directive because the drafters 
viewed the issue as one involving fundamental drafting philosophy.89 
The provision codified the drafters' belief that Code provisions were to 
be interpreted and applied in accordance with their reason, purpose, 
and substance.9o Any other kind of interpretation would represent a 
victory of form over substance. The drafters' position on this issue, in 
the face of criticism that the provision would encourage litigation,91 
suggests that they were not concerned with reducing litigation at the 
expense of reason and policy. This particular section reflected the 
drafters' assumption that the special merchant provisions, including the 
implied warranty of merchantability provision, represented, at most, 
judicial guidelines.92 An individual could fall within or without a pro-
vision's guidelines depending upon the circumstances and the policy 
encompassed by the provision. Undoubtedly, the drafters deleted the 
provision because that was the politically expedient course of action,93 
but deletion did not reflect their jurisprudential beliefs. On the basis of 
this evidence alone, it is unreasonable to assume that the drafters be-
86. ld. § 1(3). 
87. /d. 
88. Compare FINAL DRAFT #l, supra note 84, § 1(3) with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE MAY 1949 DRAFT§ l-201(3) [hereinafter cited as MAY 1949 DRAFT]. 
89. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, A Report on Developments from May 
1950 Through February 1951, 6 Bus. LAW. 113, 181 (1951). 
90. Professor Williston vehemently objected to this provision on the grounds that it 
would encourage litigation. Williston, supra note 84, at 562. 
91. /d. 
92. Malcolm, supra note 89. 
93. William Schnader remarked that "I can . . . state that what Professor Llewellyn 
believed should be the articles of an ideal commercial code were not the articles as they 
emerged from the crucible of debate when the Code was promulgated." Schnader, supra 
note 66, at 5. Professor Llewellyn himself said: "I am ashamed of it [the Code] in some 
ways; . . . there are so many beautiful ideas I tried to get in that would have been good for 
the law, but I was voted down. A wide body of opinion has worked the law into some sort of 
compromise after debate and after exhaustive work. However, when you compare it with 
anything that there is, it is an infinite improvement." Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 
22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 784 (1953) (address delivered at the 1952 Convention of the Tennes-
see Bar Association). 
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lieved that buyers from non-merchant sellers could never entertain "2-
314 type" quality expectations. 
Other article 2 provisions also suggest that the merchant distinc-
tion did not arise because the drafters believed that buyers from non-
merchant sellers could not entertain reasonable minimum quality ex-
pectations. The functional overlap between sections 2-314 and 2-315 
causes section 2-315 to protect some of the very same expectations nor-
mally protected by section 2-314.94 In addition, a comment to section 
2-314 states that "a person making an isolated sale of goods is not a 
'merchant' within the meaning of the full scope of this section 2-314 
and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply."95 Thus, a car 
mechanic selling a car from his repair shop, a watch repairman selling 
a watch, or a Maytag repairman selling a used Maytag washing 
machine would not be merchants for purposes of section 2-314. In the 
absence of an express disclaimer or other circumstances indicating that 
these sellers were not assuming any quality responsibility, however, a 
reasonable buyer would expect a car that would run, a watch that 
would tell time and a washing machine that would wash clothes. Sec-
tion 2-314's merchant restriction does deny legal effect to those quality 
expectations, but surely it does not do so because the expectations are 
unreasonable. Such a conclusion makes even less sense in light of sec-
tion 2-315. Each of the above-mentioned sellers has expertise with re-
spect to the goods involved. The circumstances of the sales 
transactions could create an implied obligation on the part of the seller 
to deliver goods fit for the buyer's particular purpose that might be 
their ordinary purpose as well. The same expectations that would be 
unreasonable under section 2-314 would be reasonable and, what is 
more, enforceable under section 2-315. When viewed together, the 
drafters' jurisprudential commitment to flexibility, the Code's legisla-
tive history, and the ramifications of sections 2-314 and 2-315 establish 
that the drafters did not draft the merchant restriction because buyers 
from non-merchant sellers could not have reasonable quality 
expectations. 
The assumption that buyers buying from non-merchant sellers 
cannot entertain reasonable quality expectations embodies a normative 
approach to contractual expectations. Such an approach ignores actual 
expectations and contractual understandings and prescribes the expec-
tations a buyer is entitled to have. This approach is inconsistent with 
94. See supra notes 56-61 & accompanying text. 
95. U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 3. 
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the general legal impulse to protect actual contractual understandings96 
as well as with the Code's fundamental premise of freedom of con-
tract.97 If the circumstances suggest that the buyer has not assumed all 
risks with respect to quality, and the purchase price reflects that, section 
2-314 should not preclude enforcement of the parties' actual contrac-
tual understanding just because the buyer ought to have paid a lesser 
purchase price and assumed all the risks. If he pays a "greater" price 
and contemplates merchantable goods, why should section 2-314 deny 
effect to the actual bargain? 
A normative interpretation of section 2-314's merchant restriction 
is simply a modem restatement of caveat emptor.98 Implicit in caveat 
emptor is the belief that a buyer purchasing goods from a seller does 
not have to assume any quality risks because he always has the option 
to elicit an express warranty. The buyer who fails to take such a pre-
caution is imprudent and therefore undeserving of legal protection. 
This normative reasoning is incomplete because it fails to consider 
other and more important legal norms such as the desire to effect fair-
ness in individual exchanges and the avoidance of unjust enrichment.99 
96. A good example of the judicial desire to enforce the parties' actual contractual 
understanding is Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 
709 (1944), wherein the court admitted evidence of an oral agreement despite the fact that it 
contradicted the parties' written agreement and hence could be excluded by the parol evi-
dence rule. Seven Justices voted to reverse Ze/1. Four Justices reversed on the grounds that 
parol evidence had been erroneously allowed. The other three Justices reversed on the 
grounds that the contract violated public policy. 322 U.S. 709 (1944). See also Anderson v. 
Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 67 N.W.2d 445 (1955). 
As early as 1860, the English courts expelled "the normative element from the question 
of reliance. It was now, not merely a question of whether the buyer had reasonably relied 
on the seller, or whether he ought not to have relied on his own judgment, but also if 
whether he had, in fact, done so." P. ATIYAH, THE RisE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoN-
TRACT 475 (1979). 
97. ''The effects of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as other-
wise provided in this Act and except that obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness 
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed .... " U.C.C. § 1-102(3). "Subsec-
tion (3) states affirmatively at the outset that freedom of contract is a principle of the 
Code .... " U.C.C. § 1-102(3) comment 2. 
98. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Lee, 102 Eng. Rep. 389, 392 (K.B. 1802). 
99. In writing about the history of caveat emptor, Professor Hamilton summarized the 
position of Thomas Aquinas on the issue of whether a sale was rendered unlawful because 
of a defect in the thing sold: "[Aquinas] answers that a defect in kind, in quantity, or in 
quality, if known to the vendor and unrevealed, is sin and fraud, and the sale is void. If the 
defect be unknown it is no sin. Yet the seller must make good to the buyer his loss, and 
likewise the buyer must recompense the seller if he discovers that he has received more than 
he paid for." Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1138 (1931). 
For Aquinas, morality and a sense of fair play required the seller to take back goods whose 
quality did not meet the parties' contractual expectations. The civilian approach codified 
Aquinas' moral sense. 
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During the hey-day of caveat emptor, some judges were distinctly un-
comfortable with the doctrine's unfairness. 100 Other courts tacitly ac-
knowledged the doctrine's unfairness by attempting to justify it on 
other grounds. The United States Supreme Court justified caveat 
emptor by noting that nothing was more universal in the common 
law.I01 The Illinois Supreme Court felt that the need for an estab-
lished, certain rule precluded inquiry into whether the civil law or the 
common law was best adapted to promote the ends of justice and the 
good order of society.102 Another court reasoned that the needs of 
commerce, especially the need to protect sellers from constant reclama-
tion suits, justified the common law rule of caveat emptor.103 Any 
other approach would upset the operations of trade. 104 Yet another 
court suggested that the doctrine of caveat emptor was not harmonious 
with accepted moral precepts by stating that moral fraud and legal 
fraud were not necessarily synonymous. 105 Considerations of fairness 
and justice clearly loomed in the minds of at least some courts when 
the question of caveat emptor arose. 106 These considerations of justice, 
fairness, and morality argue against a section 2-314 merchant restric-
tion. They suggest that all sellers should be responsible for their con-
100. Chancellor Kent admitted that "if the question was 'res integra' in our law, I con-
fess I should be overcome by the reasoning of the civilians." Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48, 
55 (N.Y. 1804). Chancellor Kent remained troubled by the disparity between the rule of 
caveat emptor and moral precepts. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 477-79 
(4th ed. 1840). 
101. Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 388 (1870). 
102. This was an argument made by the seller's attorney. I d. at 386. The Court echoed 
this argument in stating that "[w]hatever tends to unsettle the law and make it different in 
different communities into which the state is divided, leads to mischievous consequences, 
embarrasses trade, and is against public policy." Id. at 391. The court in Misner v. 
Granger, 9 Ill. (4 Gilm.) 69, 75 (1847), had expressed an identical sentiment. 
103. McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 56 (Pa. 1939) (Gibson, C.J.). 
104. Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73, 89 (1851). 
105. Kohl v. Lindley, 39 Ill. 195 (1866). The court noted that morality and the civil law 
would require the seller to inform the buyer of defects, but the common law had not adopted 
that position. Id. at 201. 
106. See Waddill v. Chamberlayne, 2 Barradsall 45 (Va. 1735); Barnard v. Yates, 4 
S.C.L. (I Nott & McC.) 142, 150 (1818). ("The basis upon which our decisions are founded, 
is that of honesty and correct dealing between man and man. One sanctioned by able ju-
rists, and not the less to be regarded, from its correspondence with the divine precept, 'that 
we should do unto others, what we would have them do unto us.' ") The South Carolina 
Supreme Court was so bothered by caveat emptor that it rejected it, believing that law and 
morality should be in harmony. Id. A New York court also favored common honesty in 
dealings. Gallagher & Mason v. H & H.P. Waring, 9 Wend. 20, 28 (N.Y. 1832). The Ohio 
Supreme Court did not reject the doctrine but did explain that "the requirements of manifest 
justice" compelled some exceptions to it. Rodgers & Co. v. Niles & Co., 11 Ohio St. 48, 53 
(1860). 
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tractual undertakings and that all buyers should have some recourse 
for disappointed contractual expectations. 
Concern for decency and morality pervaded Professor Llewellyn's 
thoughts as well. 107 He continually used the words "decent" and "de-
cency" in describing the source of article 2 rules. 108 Businessmen and 
business lawyers objected to article 2's imposition of a special good 
faith standard for merchants, 109 believing that it represented the draft-
ers' attempt to legislate morality in the marketplace. 110 In the face of 
all this evidence, it would be difficult to conclude that article 2 was 
drafted in a moral vacuum. The reasons motivating section 2-314's 
merchant distinction must lie elsewhere because decency, fairness, mo-
rality and justice urge a rule of universal seller responsibility. The 
Code's disclaimer and remedy provisions must be examined to deter-
mine if they justify section 2-314's position. 
Section 2-314's Merchant Distinction From The Perspective Of 
The Code's Remedy And Disclaimer Provisions 
The Code does not distinguish between its warranties in terms of 
remedies available upon breach. The same provisions apply whether 
the seller breaches a section 2-313, section 2-314, or section 2-315 war-
ranty. Upon breach, if the buyer has accepted the goods 111 and cannot 
107. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 93, at 780-82; N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT 1954, 
supra note 84, at 166 (Professor Llewellyn's remarks referring to "traps and trickeries in 
vogue among the low-life of business under the present law"); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAM-
BLE BusH !58 (1930) (7th printing 1977); FINAL DRAFT #1, supra note 84, § 7 comment. In 
a 1952 speech, Llewellyn talked about certain legal peculiarities in American sales law 
which operated as "traps which any decent system of law must not put into the hands of a 
sharpy so that he may take advantage of the man who is trying in good faith but without 
legal skill to accomplish decent results." Llewellyn, supra note 93, at 780. He described the 
effects of one such trap: "the sale is in default, the seller has no rights under his contract of 
sale; a contract that was profitable has become a loss because of a trap in the law which 
penalizes good faith and makes bad faith profitable." Id. at 781. 
108. "There is a certain decency between businessmen and there ought to be .... " 
N.Y. LAW REviSION REPORT 1954, supra note 84, at 166 (Professor Llewellyn's testimony). 
See also Llewellyn, supra note 93, at 779, 781-82. 
109. At issue was the definition of good faith which was defined in article I to include 
"observance by a person of the reasonable commerical standards of any business or trade in 
which he engaged." MAY 1949 DRAFT, supra note-88, § 1-201(18). Article 1's definition of 
good faith ultimately did not mention the observance of reasonable comercial standards. 
U.C.C. § 1-201(19). The concept was resurrected in article 2, which imposes a special stan-
dard of good faith on merchants. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b). 
110. Report of Commillee on the Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAw 119, 127-28 
(1952) [hereinafter cited as Report of Committee]. 
Ill. Acceptance of goods includes actual acceptance and failure to make an effective 
rejection. U.C.C. § 2-606. 
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revoke his acceptance,112 his damages are governed by section 2-714(2) 
which provides that the buyer may recover "the difference at the time 
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and 
the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless 
special circumstances show proximate damages of a different 
amount." 113 Section 2-714 also authorizes the recovery of consequent-
ial damages for breach of warranty "in a proper case." 114 Section 2-
715(2) dealing with consequential damages provides that 
consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include 
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and 
needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to 
know about and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover 
or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property proximately result-
ing from any breach of warranty. IIS 
The seller who gives a warranty potentially incurs substantiallia-
bility.II6 Liability for consequential loss makes him an insurer of the 
goods' quality. Comment 3 to section 2-715 states that "[i]t is not nec-
essary that there be a conscious acceptance of an insurer's liability on 
the seller's part, nor is his obligation for consequential damages limited 
to cases in which he fails to use due effort in good faith." 117 
The possibility of such substantial liability may explain section 2-
314's merchant distinction. Arguably, it would be unfair to impose 
such onerous responsibility on non-merchant sellers. Section 2-314 
avoids that undesirable result by restricting itself to merchant sellers. 
But non-merchants can give a section 2-315 warranty. If breached, the 
non-merchant seller will incur the very same liability. Thus, the desire 
to shield non-merchant sellers from consequential liability does not ra-
tionalize section 2-314's merchant restriction. 
According to section 2-719(1), all sellers, by agreement with their 
112. To revoke his acceptance, a buyer must establish that the non-conformity substan-
tially impairs the value of the goods to him. U.C.C. § 2-608(1). In addition, he must revoke 
within a reasonable time and before substantial change in the goods not caused by the de-
fects. U.C.C. § 2-608(2). For a discussion of the complicated web which the Code weaves 
in this area, see Whaley, Tender, Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation-The UCC's 
"TARR"-Baby, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 52 (1974). 
113. u.c.c. § 2-714(2). 
114. /d. § 2-714(3). 
115. /d. § 2-715(2). 
116. The warranty-giving seller need not incur consequential liability. The Code autho-
rizes the exclusion of consequential liability if such exclusion is not unconscionable. /d. § 2-
719(3). For a more detailed discussion, see infra notes 118-24 & accompanying text. 
117. U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 3. 
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buyers, can limit the buyer's remedy for breach of warranty. 118 They 
can agree to an exclusive remedy"9 which will be enforceable unless it 
fails in its essential purpose. 120 In addition, the parties can agree to 
limit or exclude consequential damages, unless to do so would be un-
conscionable.'21 Comment 3 to section 2-719 also states that clauses 
excluding or limiting consequential damages "are merely an allocation 
of unknown or undeterminable risks." 122 By authorizing the exclusion 
or limitation of consequential damages, the Code permits parties to al-
locate such risks subject to an outer limit of unconscionability. 
Comment 1 to section 2-719 describes the drafters' over-all reme-
dial approach: 
[l]t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum 
adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to conclude a 
contract for sale within this Article they must accept the legal conse-
quence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of 
the obligations or duties outlined in the contract. 123 
In the absence of a section 2-313 or section 2-315 warranty, the buyer 
from a non-merchant seller has no "fair quantum of remedy" for disap-
pointed expectations of quality. The absence of a buyer remedy is con-
sistent with the comment, however, because the Code does not 
recognize a section 2-314 non-merchant seller contractual obligation. 
In the absence of such an obligation, there is no need to provide a mini-
mum adequate remedy. Although the conclusion of no remedy follows 
from the premise of no obligation, the underlying premise remains 
unexplained. 
Within certain limits, the Code authorizes a seller to provide for 
an exclusive remedy or to exclude consequential liability. In doing so, 
the Code permits all sellers to avoid most of the hazards entailed by 
giving a warranty. Of course, the non-merchant seller who does not 
give a section 2-313 or section 2-315 warranty does not care. He is 
wholly unconcerned with ways of limiting the contractual remedy or 
excluding consequential liability. In a non-merchant sale, section 2-
118. /d.§ 2-719(1). Typically, such an agreement will limit the buyer to a refund of his 
purchase price or to a replacement of non-conforming goods or parts. /d.§ 2-719(1)(a). 
119. ld. § 2-719(l)(b). 
120. /d.§ 2-719(2). An exclusive remedy will fail in its essential purpose if, under the 
circumstance, it fails to provide any remedy at all. See, e.g., Wilson Trading Corp. v. David 
Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968). 
121. U.C.C. 2-719(3). This section states that "[l]imitation of consequential damages for 
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limita-
tion of damages where the loss is commercial is not." /d. 
122. /d.§ 2-719 comment 3. 
123. /d.§ 2-719 comment l. 
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314 allocates all unknown or undeterminable risks to the buyer includ-
ing even risks of personal injury. 124 Whether the purchase price reflects 
a different understanding is irrelevant for purposes of section 2-314. 
The Code also gives sellers the power to disclaim the implied war-
ranties.125 In this way, sellers can avoid all possibility of liability. In 
addition, the Code describes certain circumstances which exclude the 
implied warranties. 126 If excluded or disclaimed, the buyer will have 
no recourse even against the merchant seller for quality. 
Although the Code makes it difficult to disclaim express warran-
ties, 127 and most sales are accompanied by some kind of express war-
ranty, e.g. , a description of the goods, 128 this kind of express warranty 
may not result in any seller responsibility for quality. If a seller ex-
pressly agrees to sell a car, it is the section 2-314 warranty of 
merchantability which establishes that the seller must deliver an object 
which is driveable. 129 If the implied warranties are excluded or dis-
124. See, e.g., Brescia v. Great Road Realty Trust, 117 N.H. 154, 373 A.2d 1310 ( 1977); 
Allen v. Nicole, Inc., 172 N.J. Super. 442, 412 A.2d 824 (1980); Samson v. Riesing, 62 Wis. 
2d 698, 215 N.W.2d 662 (1974). 
125. U.C.C. § 2-316(2). A seller can disclaim an implied warranty of merchantability 
orally if he mentions "merchantability." If he chooses to disclaim in writing (a course most 
prudent sellers would pursue for evidentiary purposes), the seller must mention 
merchantability and disclaim in a conspicuous fashion. Id. The seller can disclaim the 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose only by a writing which is conspicuous 
although no particular language is required. I d. Section 2-316(2) posits formalities to insure 
that the buyer understands the terms of the bargain. Id. § 2-316 comment 1. It is not clear 
that requiring mention of "merchantability" advances that purpose. Professor Whaley 
stated: "The Code drafters lived in a fictive world in which all babes are born with instinc-
tive knowledge of the meaning of the word 'merchantability.' ... [T]he problem is that no 
such world exists. It is the rarest buyer today who understands the concept of 
merchantability-indeed, many lawyers do not.'' D. WHALEY, supra note 23, at 92. It is 
unclear whether the seller's right to disclaim all implied warranties is subject to an outer 
limit of unconscionability. Neither the text nor the comments to§ 2-316 suggest that a valid 
disclaimer under§ 2-316(2) can be held invalid under the unconscionability provision. A 
comment to§ 2-719(3) states that "[t]he seller in all cases is free to disclaim all warranties in 
the manner provided in Section 2-316.'' U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3. This seems to indicate 
that the unconscionability limitation in§ 2-719 does not apply to § 2-316. Section 2-302, 
however, authorizes the court to find a contract or any clause unconscionable at the time it 
was made. I d. § 2-302(1). This would suggest that § 2-302 applies to seller attempts to 
disclaim under § 2-316. The drafters created some degree of confusion by specifically men-
tioning unconscionability in § 2-719(3). Arguably any contract or clause is subject to a 
charge of unconscionability. 
126. U.C.C. § 2-316(3). See infra notes 138-44 & accompanying text. 
127. If language or conduct suggesting an express warranty contlicts with that tending to 
negate the warranty, the negation is inoperative. U.C.C. § 2-316(1). 
128. Express warranties include "[a]ny description of the goods which is made part of 
the basis of the bargain ... .'' Id. § 2-313(1)(b). 
129. Professors Summers and White argue that a buyer "can reasonably believe that the 
word automobile is an express warranty that the machine purchased will behave in a certain 
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claimed, arguably the seller's delivery of an object resembling a car 
would satisfy his express undertaking. Of course, receipt of an object 
that looks like a car but does not function like a car would not fulfill 
the buyer's presumed reasonable expectations in buying something de-
scribed as "a car." Section 2-316, governing the exclusion or disclaimer 
of implied warranties, intends to avoid such buyer surprise, 130 insuring 
that the buyer who buys without the seller's implied warranties under-
stands that that is what he is doing. 131 
Section 2-316 describes several circumstances that preclude im-
plied warranties. 132 These circumstances suggest that section 2-3 16 
seeks simply to enforce the parties' actual contractual understanding. 
Trade usage, course of dealing, and the parties' course of performance 
of their contract can preclude the finding of implied warranties. 133 
Logically, parties transacting a deal in a trade which by usage estab-
lishes that buyers assume the risks for certain defects, 134 understand 
that the buyer, rather than the seller, assumes the risks for those de-
way, namely, that it will carry him around town for at least a few thousand miles. Finding 
the meaning of such one-word descriptions is much like defining the meaning of the implied 
warranty of merchantability in various contexts." J. SUMMERS & R. WHITE, supra note 12, 
§ 9-3. Arguably, the function of an implied warranty of merchantability is just that, to de-
fine the quality responsibility of a seller entailed by such an express warranty. The Code 
artificially and needlessly segregates the seller's essential undertaking. In Randall v. New-
son, 46 L.J.Q.B. 259 (1877), Judge Brett stated: "[t]he governing principle ... is that the 
thing offered and delivered . . . must answer the description of it which is contained in 
words in the contract, or which would be so contained if the contract were accurately drawn 
out." /d. at 263 (quoted in E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, supra note 17, at 511 n.l3). 
These authors ask whether despite complexity and diversity of the Code's statutory provi-
sions, they are inspired by a common principle. E. FARNSWORTH & J. HoNNOLD, supra note 
17, at 511. Professor Whaley argues that the word "car" is an express warranty. D. WHA-
LEY, supra note 23, at 25. If the seller delivers a car without an engine, the warranty is 
breached because "a car body without a working engine is not what most people think of as 
a car." /d. The whole concept of merchantability protected by§ 2-314, however, appears to 
attempt to capture what reasonable people think about a particular bargain. See supra notes 
29-51 & accompanying text. 
130. See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment I. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. § 2-316(2)-(3). 
133. /d. § 2-316(3)(c). 
134. For instance, in the New Mexico cattle industry, trade usage establishes that a 
knowledgeable buyer, buying from a seller who makes no express representations, buys with 
no implied warranties. Fear Ranches, Inc. v. H.C. Berry, 503 F.2d 953 (lOth Cir. 1974). To 
remove all doubt on the question of allocation of risk with respect to diseased livestock. the 
Kansas Legislature enacted legislation to provide that no implied warranties accompany the 
sale of livestock other than sales for immediate slaughter unless the seller knowingly sells 
diseased livestock. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-316(3)( d) ( 1983). See also Rasor, The History of 
Warranties of Quality in the Sale of Goods: Contract or Tort ?-A Case Study in Full Circles, 
21 WASHBURN L.J. 175, 185 n.85 (1982). 
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fects. The same holds true with respect to course of dealing and course 
of performance. The parties' own prior understanding establishes their 
present understanding as to quality risks. 135 So, too, if the seller de-
mands that the buyer examine the goods before entering into a contract 
for them, the parties understand that the buyer rather than the seller is 
assuming the risk with respect to defects which the buyer ought to have 
observed.I36 For instance, if a seller is offering a car with a broken 
antenna and demands that the buyer examine the car, a buyer, in 
agreeing to buy the car, understands full well that he is buying a car 
with a broken antenna.I37 
In addition, section 2-316(3) establishes that language such as "as 
is" or ''with all faults" or other expressions which call the buyer's atten-
tion to the fact that the seller is not assuming any quality responsibility 
with respect to the goods will preclude the implied warranties.l.38 Once 
again, this suggests that section 2-316 seeks to capture the parties' ac-
tual contractual understanding. The buyer understands that the seller 
is not making any promises as to quality and hence, the buyer under-
stands that he is assuming all risks with respect to quality.139 
Section 2-316 establishes that a buyer purchasing from a merchant 
seller may be in the same position as a buyer purchasing from a non-
merchant seller: he may have no recourse at all for defective goods if 
the warranties have been disclaimed or excluded. On the other hand, 
the buyer buying from a non-merchant se.Uer who extracts an express 
warranty that the goods are merchantable or guaranteed is in the same 
effective position as the buyer from the non-disclaiming merchant 
seller: both kinds of buyers will have recourse against their sellers for 
unmerchantable goods although under different Code secti6ns. 140 
The parties, whatever the seller's status, are free to agree to the 
bargain of their choosing. Absent such a contract, however, the Code 
establishes presumptions about contractual understanding predicated 
on seller status. Section 2-314(1) presumes that the merchant seller 
135. If, in prior dealings, the parties understood that the seller was not assuming respon-
sibilty for certain defects, logically that understanding would govern their present contrac-
tual understanding absent explicit change. 
136. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) & comment 8. 
137. Guess v. Lorenz, 612 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. App. 1981). 
138. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a). 
139. Section 2-316(2) describes the formal Code methods for disclaiming implied war-
ranties. See supra note 125. 
140. The non-merchant seller who guarantees his goods gives an express warranty. 
U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a). Section 2-314 furnishes "a guide to the content of the resulting express 
warranty." Id. § 2-314 comment 4. Thus, the buyer would sue the seller under§ 2-313 but 
the court would refer to§ 2-314 to flesh out the substantive content of the warranty. 
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promises to provide merchantable goods and that the non-merchant 
seller does not. 141 
The Code does not explain the source of these very different pre-
sumptions. Perhaps section 2-314 is qualitatively different from its 
brothers, sections 2-313 and 2-315. It can be argued that the latter sec-
tions recognize and enforce the parties' actual contractual intentions 
and understandings. In section 2-313, the actual contractual under-
standing arises by words, either spoken or written, or by visual aids, 
such as models or samples. In section 2-315, the actual understanding 
and intentions arise from the parties' conduct and the circumstances 
surrounding the sale. Some argue that in contrast, section 2-314 repre-
sents a legal obligation which exists irrespective of the parties' actual 
contractual understanding. 142 Section 2-314 is a legal fiction imposed 
as a matter of public policy. 143 This theory of section 2-314 indirectly 
explains why sections 2-313 and 2-315 are not restricted in their appli-
cation to a particular class of sellers. Any seller has the freedom to 
contract as he wishes. 144 If he elects to assume quality responsibility, 
the Code enforces that freely undertaken responsibility. If, however, 
the quality responsibility is imposed by law, the class of sellers "im-
posed upon" should be determined and limited by the policy consider-
ations giving rise to the implied-in-law obligation. 
Whether section 2-314 merely gives legal effect to a buyer's actual 
reasonable contractual expectations or imposes quality obligations irre-
spective of the parties' actual understanding is a matter of some de-
bate.145 If, in fact, section 2-314 protects a buyer's actual, reasonable 
quality expectations, section 2-314's merchant mystery remains un-
solved. On the other hand, if section 2-314 imposes its quality obliga-
tions as a matter of public policy, an explanation for its merchant 
distinction may be at hand. There is only one problem-nowhere does 
141. The Code presumptions do not operate if the merchant seller disclaims the§ 2-314 
warranty or the non-merchant seller guarantees his goods. 
142. In other words, the warranty is "implied in law" and therefore is a legal fiction 
devised to accomplish some public policy goal. See, e.g., D. WHALEY, supra note 23, at 21. 
42; Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 670. 
143. D. WHALEY, supra note 23, at 43. 
144. U.C.C. § 1-102(3). See supra note 96 & accompanying text. 
145. At some point, the implied-in-fact and implied-in-law theories of warranty merge. 
The buyer's actual reasonable expectations may be identical to the common expectations 
aroused by such a sale. "Implied warranties reflect society's judgments about the basic un-
derstandings of the foundation of most deals .... " D. WHALEY, supra note 23, at 21. 
These societal judgments arise from common understandings, i.e., the buyer's actual and 
reasonable understanding in the transaction. In this sense, the debate over the nature of the 
§ 2-314 warranty is somewhat artificial as well as misleading. 
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section 2-314 state a public policy. Obviously, the absence of an ex-
pressed policy impedes evaluation of the section's merchant distinction. 
One code provision remains as a source of possible enlightenment: sec-
tion 2-104, the Code's definition of "merchant." 
Section 2-314's Merchant Distinction From The Perspective Of 
The Code's Merchant Definition 
To determine who qualifies as a merchant for purposes of section 
2-314, one must refer to section 2-104, which defines the term 
"merchant" as 
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupa-
tion holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the 
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such 
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent 
or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself 
out as having such knowledge or skill.l46 
Section 2-104 actually includes thirteen different merchant defini-
tions.l47 Although the text of section 2-104 suggests that anyone who 
qualifies under the definition will be a merchant for all article 2 pur-
poses, the comments correct that impression. 148 Merchant status under 
section 2-104 depends upon the particular code section involved, 
which, in tum, depends upon the legal issue involved.149 The com-
ments indicate that the merchant concept is grounded in the idea of 
professionalism.150 Professional status can take one of two forms: pro-
146. u.c.c. § 2-104(1). 
147. Newell, supra note 65, at 315-16. Professor Mellinkoffwrote that "[e]very reader of 
the U.C.C. will find his own candidate for first place in the cross-country sentence derby." 
Mellinkoff, supra note 83, at 220. Section 2-104(1) is this author's winner. 
148. U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 2. Professor Homer Kripke is probably the one to be 
thanked for the comments' elucidation on who qualifies as a merchant. In a 1951 meeting of 
the editorial board, Professor Kripke (through notes exchanged across the table) pointed out 
to Professor Mentschikoff that§ 2-104 was ambiguous. Hearing Bifore Enlarged Editorial 
Board, January27-29, 1951,6 Bus. LAW. 164, 183 (1951) (Professor Kripke's remarks) [here-
inafter cited as Hearing Bifore Board]. Professor Mentschikoff told him that that was the 
drafters' intention. I d. Section 2-104's ambiguity continued to be a focal point of discus-
sion. See, e.g., Study of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales, I N.Y. LAW REvi-
SION REPORT 347, 359 (1955) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT 1955]. 
Professor Llewellyn, appearing before the 1954 Law Review Commission, stated: "The only 
thing that has been done, after considerable discussion, has been to so modify the comment, 
not the text, as to show that knowledge or skill with regard to practices or goods involved 
means knowledge as to practices when the question is one of practices, and knowledge as to 
goods when the problem is one of goods." N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT 1954, supra note 84, 
at 168. 
149. U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 2. 
150. Id. § 2-104 comment 1. 
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fessionalism with respect to goods or professionalism with respect to 
business practices.l5 1 The nature of the professionalism required for 
merchant status depends upon the pertinent Code provision. 152 The 
comments establish that the section 2-314 merchant requires a profes-
sional status with respect to goods. 153 Professional status with respect 
to business practices is irrelevant. 154 For purposes of section 2-314, 
then, section 2-104 defines "merchant" as one who deals in goods of the 
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowl-
edge or skill peculiar to the goods involved in the transaction. 155 
Having determined the class of sellers who by law give the implied 
warranty of merchantability, it would appear that the public policy for-
warded by section 2-314 is none other than to give effect to the reason-
able expectations of the parties. After all, what can be more reasonable 
than to expect a merchantable product from one who is in the business 
of selling that product? A buyer who buys ping pong balls from some-
one in the business of selling them reasonably expects and relies on the 
seller to provide balls that will bounce adequately on a ping pong table. 
A buyer who buys a new car from a car dealer reasonably expects a car 
that will require minor adjustments at most. A seller who deals in 
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as 
having knowledge or skill with respect to those goods impliedly com-
municates to the world that expectations of quality are reasonable with 
respect to his sales. Buyers can rely on him. 
Viewed from a section 2-104 perspective, section 2-314(1) appears 
to codify a policy that sellers should be responsible for the reasonable 
quality expectations generated by their status. That policy, however, 
does not justify section 2-314's merchant restriction. There are too 
many sellers who do not qualify as section 2-314 merchants whose sta-
tus with respect to goods would create reasonable expectations. The 
lSI. ld. § 2-104 comment 2. 
1S2. /d. For instance, if the issue involves§ 2-201, the Code's Statute of Frauds provi-
sion, the merchant would be anyone with specialized knowledge of business practices. 
U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 2. If the issue involves a good faith purchaser's interest in property 
vis-a-vis the true owner of the property, the entrusting provision of§ 2-403, only sellers who 
deal in goods of the kind would be considered merchants. /d. Under certain Code provi-
sions, for instance, § 2-S09 (risk of loss) and § 2-103(l)(b) (good faith standard for 
merchants), the merchant could be either a businessman or one who sold goods of the kind. 
/d. 
1S3. U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 2. 
1S4. The§ 2-314 warranty is restricted "to a much smaller group than everyone who is 
engaged in business .... " Jd. 
ISS. U.C.C. § 2-104(1). Elimination of all references to "practices" in the § 2-104(1) 
definition produces the relevant wording for § 2-314 purposes. 
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comments to section 2-314 establish, and the courts routinely hold, that 
sellers making isolated sales are not merchants for purposes of section 
2-314 and thus do not give an implied warranty ofmerchantability.I56 
Those who otherwise might seem to qualify as section 2-314 merchants 
do not. A professional sailor who sells his boat, a car mechanic who 
sells a car, a professional golfer who sells his clubs, all these people by 
their occupation hold themselves out as having knowledge or skill with 
respect to their goods. Surely their buyers can entertain some unarticu-
lated reasonable expectations of quality and yet, for purposes of section 
2-314, these sellers are not merchants. In drafting section 2-314 and its 
merchant distinction, the drafters seemingly were not seeking to hold 
all sellers responsible for the quality expectations raised by their status. 
The comment excluding isolated sales from section 2-314 cover-
agei57 cannot be dismissed as an "old" comment inconsistent with the 
present text. The drafting history of section 2-314 establishes that the 
drafters intended to exclude isolated sales. Originally, the isolated sale 
exception only applied to sales of used goods. I 58 In successive drafts, 
however, the exception was uniformly discussed in more general 
terms.I59 In light of the extended drafting and review period I6o and the 
relatively few changes made in section 2-314 and its comments, we can 
assume that the drafters intended what they said. Section 2-314 does 
156. "A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a 'merchant' within the meaning 
of the full scope of this section, and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply." 
U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 3. See, e.g., Jatco, Inc. v. Charter Air Center, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 
314 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Bevard v. Ajax Mfg. Co., 473 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Siemen 
v. Alden, 34 m App. 3d 961, 341 N.E.2d 713 (1975). 
157. U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 3. 
158. The comments to the 1949 draft read: "In contrast, a contract for the sale of sec-
ond-hand goods can involve only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods. A person 
making an isolated sale of such goods would not be a "merchant" within the meaning of the 
full scope of this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply." MAY 1949 
DRAFT, supra note 88, § 2-314 comment 3. Presumably, at that time, the drafters wanted to 
exempt an individual private sale of a used television, for example. Professor Llewellyn 
once remarked that separate rules to govern mercantile transactions ''rest on a vital need for 
distinguishing merchants from housewives and from farmers and from mere lawyers." N.Y. 
LAW REVISION REPORT 1954, supra note 84, at 108. 
159. Subsequent drafts omitted the "such" after "isolated sale of," thus changing the 
meaning substantially. The comment to the May 1950 draft read: "A contract for the sale of 
secondhand goods, however, involves only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods. 
A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a "merchant" within the meaning of the 
full scope of this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply. MAY 1950 
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFTS§ 2-314 comment 3. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE OF-
FICIAL TEXT§ 2-314 comment 3 (1972); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE FINAL DRAFT§ 2-
314 comment 3 (1952). 
160. See supra note 84. 
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not apply to an isolated sale even if the seller by his occupation holds 
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods. 
Consideration of section 2-104 thus brings us back to square one, 
if not further back. Not only does the public policy underlying section 
2-314 still elude us, but the merchant definition as applied to section 2-
314 makes little sense. Who, other than dealers, will qualify as section 
2-314 merchants? Is there anyone in the real world who (I) will not be 
a dealer, (2) will by his occupation hold himself out as having knowl-
edge or skill with respect to the goods, and (3) will not be involved in 
an isolated sale? The class of section 2-314 merchants defined by the 
second half of section 2-104 appears to be empty. 161 
The likelihood that this represents a drafting blunder is remote. 
Professor Llewellyn was too attached to the legal concept of merchant 
and too ardent in his desire to introduce the merchant concept into 
American sales law to have drafted a merchant definition, half of 
which was bereft of substance. Section 2-104's legislative history 
reveals Professor Llewellyn's thinking and also provides the first real 
clue to the origins and reasoning behind section 2-314's merchant 
distinction. 
Section 2-104 made its public debut in 1949. 162 In substance and 
wording, it was identical to the merchant definition Professor Llewellyn 
drafted in his revision of the USA. 163 Professor Llewellyn defined 
"merchant" solely in terms of the "by his occupation holds himself 
out" language. 164 The definition did not include any reference to 
"those who deal in goods of the kind." 165 The 1949 draft provided thir-
161. Professors Summers and White argue that the second half of the§ 2-314 merchant 
definition applies to "electricians, plumbers, carpenters, boat builders and the like." J. 
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 9-6. This interpretation does not make sense. 
Plumbers deal in plumbing fixtures, electricians deal in electrical supplies, boat builders in 
boats. The "deals in" language encompasses them. Professor Nordstrom does not address 
the§ 2-104(1) language in a§ 2-314 context but argues that the second ha1fofthe merchant 
definition limits the class of merchant sellers of used goods. R. NoRDSTROM, supra note 12, 
§ 134, at 408 n.25. ''The Code did not intend to make every seller of used goods a 
'merchant' simply because the seller had knowledge concerning those goods. All owners of 
goods have knowledge of their goods .... The Code accomplishes this distinction by limit-
ing the goods and practices portion of the definition of merchant to a person who by his 
occupation holds himself out as having the requisite knowledge or skill." /d. (emphasis in 
original). This explanation does not explain§ 2-104(1)'s meaning in a§ 2-314 context. 
162. The May 1949 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code was submitted to "a joint 
meeting of the sponsoring organizations held in St. Louis, Missouri, in September of 1949." 
R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, supra note 67, at 24-25. 
163. Compare § 7 of FINAL DRAFT #1, supra note 84, with § 2-104(1) of the MAY 1949 
DRAFT, supra note 88. 
164. See supra notes 85, 163. 
165. This language, which ultimately became a part of the present definition of§ 2-
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teen special rules for merchants.I66 
From the moment of article 2's official introduction, scholars as 
well as lawyers voiced serious reservations about Professor Llewellyn's 
merchant.167 They questioned the need for two sets of rules, one for 
merchants, another for non-merchants.168 In addition, even if the need 
existed, many found section 2-104's definition unmanageable. 169 It was 
ambiguous,11o odd,171 and difficult to construe.172 
In response to the "doubting Thomases" who questioned the need 
for a bifurcation of American sales law into one set of rules governing 
merchants and another governing non-merchants, Professor Llewellyn 
retorted that not only did American sales law need this concept, it al-
ready existed.173 According to Professor Llewellyn, wise courts already 
distinguished between mercantile and non-mercantile transactions in 
reaching their decisions.174 In addition, the USA even codified the 
merchant bifurcation in one of its provisions.175 Interestingly enough, 
104(1), appeared in the September 1950 proposed final draft of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. See infra notes 186-98 & accompanying text. 
166. These special merchant provisions remained constant throughout the drafting and 
review process. The Code's special merchant provisions are: § 2-103(l)(b) (Good Faith); 
§ 2-201(2) (Statute of Frauds); § 2-205 (Firm Offers); § 2-207(2) (Additional Terms in Ac-
ceptance);§ 2-209(2) (Modification, Rescission and Waiver);§ 2-312(3) (Warranty ofTitle); 
§ 2-314 (Implied Warranty of Merchantability);§ 2-327(1)(c) (Sale on Approval);§ 2-402(2) 
(Rights of Seller's Creditors); § 2-403(2) (Entrusting); § 2-509(3) (Risk of Loss); § 2-603(1) 
(Rightful Rejection); § 2-605(l)(b) (Waiver of Buyer's Objections by Failure to Particular-
ize); and § 2-609(2) (Adequate Assurance of Performance). 
167. See, e.g., Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in Cod!fica-
tion, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (1951); Kripke, The Principles Underlying the .Drajiing 
of the U. C C, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 321, 325-26; Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commer-
cial Code, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 427, 431-33 (1950); Waite, The Proposed New Un!form Sales 
Act, 48 MICH. L. REv. 603, 607, 618-19 (1950); Williston, supra note 84, at 571-73, 584; see 
also Report of Commillee on the Proposed Commercial Code, .Developments Since September 
1949 Report, 6 Bus. LAW 119, 126-29 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Report of Commillee]; 
Hearing Before Board, supra note 148, at 181-83. 
168. See, e.g.,Report ofCommillee,supra note 167, at 126; N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT 
1955, supra note 148, at 107-08, 164-65, 351 (Honnold's statement); N.Y. LAW REVISION 
REPORT 1954, supra note 84, at 137 (Fifield's testimony); Waite, supra note 167, at 607; 
Williston, supra note 84, at 572-73. 
169. See, e.g., Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 
291; Hearing Bifore Board, supra note 148, at 181-83; Rabel, supra note 167, at 432; Waite, 
supra note 167, at 618-19; Williston, supra note 84, at 571-73. 
170. Hearing Bifore Board, supra note 148, at 183 (Professor Kripke's remarks). 
171. Waite, supra note 167, at 618. 
172. Comment, Merchant Provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 39 GEo. 
L.J. 130, 131 (1950). 
173. N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT 1954, supra note 84, at 165 (Professor Llewellyn's 
remarks). 
174. /d. 
175. /d. at 165-66. 
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the codification to which he was referring, section 15(2) of the USA, 
dealt with the Act's implied warranty of merchantability. 176 
Professor Llewellyn apparently equated the section 15(2) seller 
with the section 2-314 merchant. In a 1937 article, he discussed the 
USA and its implied warranty of merchantability. 177 He criticized the 
Act's failure to define the concept of "merchantability," 178 objected to 
its election of remedies doctrine which gave the buyer the unpalatable 
choice between rescission and damages, 179 and did not like its require-
ment of a sale by description. 180 His own version of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability reflected these criticisms by defining the 
concept of merchantable181 and eliminating the requirement of a sale 
by description. 182 Article 2 abolished the election of remedies doc-
trine.183 In criticizing section 15(2), Professor Llewellyn never once 
criticized the class of sellers subject to it. Not one to mince words when 
words were due, 184 his failure to criticize alone could be construed as 
176. USA§ 15(2). In hearings before the New York Law Revision Commission, Profes-
sor Llewellyn stated: "Now, may I tum to the matter of the introduction of the concept of 
"merchant" into the Code? Let me begin by pointing out that this is not something new in 
the law. What this is, instead, is a bringing into clarity and explicit focus of a thing which is 
really there and which has been in the law of sales for something more than a hundred 
years. There are a few places in the present statute in which that becomes explicit. In Sec-
tion 152 [New York's version of§ 15(2) of the USA] of the present statute is a provision that 
there is a warranty of merchantability when the goods are sold by a dealer who deals in 
goods of that description . . . and if he is not a merchant with respect to those goods, I am 
sure I don't know who is .... " N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT 1954, supra note 84, at 165 
(Professor Llewellyn's remarks). 
Later, he commented: "One of the things that reads in this memorandum again and 
again is the notion that there should not be different rules for merchants or for people in one 
trade or occupation from those which are had for people in another. I refer again for the 
moment to Section 15(2) of the old Act which provides a rule that we still have in the Code, 
that sales of goods by a merchant who deals in goods of that description ought to carry a 
warranty of merchantability. This makes good sense. We all know it. We all feel it." /d. at 
165-66. 
177. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341,381-84 
(1937). 
178. ld. at 383. 
179. /d. at 390. He poses the situation of a horse warranted "gentle" which, in fact, is 
vicious and kicks the buyer's son. /d. Under the USA, the buyer could choose between the 
following alternatives: keep the horse, and risk another kick; shoot him and pay the price; or 
rescind the sale and forego damages. "This is not sense," concluded Professor Llewellyn. 
/d. 
180. /d. at 384-87. 
181. u.c.c. § 2-314(2). 
182. /d.§ 2-314(1). 
183. "[T]he buyer is no longer required to elect between revocation of acceptance and 
recovery of damages for breach. . . . The remedy under this section . . . involves no sug-
gestion of 'election' of any sort." I d. § 2-608 comment I. 
184. In his second warranty article, correcting some observations made in his first, Pro-
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approval. But he did more than remain silent. He was positively effu-
sive. He praised the USA's ''yeoman work" in regard to the creation of 
responsibility in a seller, in light of modem social and technical condi-
tions.185 All of the evidence suggests that Professor Llewellyn intended 
the section 2-314 merchant to be none other than the section 15(2) 
seller. 
To understand the meaning of section 2-104's definition of 
merchant as applied to section 2-314, section 15(2) of the USA must be 
considered. It provided that "[w]here the goods are bought by descrip-
tion from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be 
the grower or manufacturer or not) there is an implied warranty that 
the goods shall be of merchantable quality."186 
The parenthetical ''whether he be the grower or manufacturer or 
not" possessed tremendous legal significance. Prior to the USA, courts 
generally agreed that manufacturers and growers of goods gave an im-
plied warranty of merchantability, 187 but disagreed over whether deal-
ers or retailers gave it.188 Professor Williston intended to settle the 
fessor Llewellyn referred to one judge as "a commercial moron." Llewellyn, supra note 177, 
at 341 (errata in part 1). In a 1952 speech to the Tennessee Bar Association, Professor Llew-
ellyn stated: "[Y]ou don't know the present law, and if you are practicing on the assumption 
that you do, all I can say to you is 'God pity your clients.' The amount of abysmal, unbe-
lievable, utterly un-understandable, base ignorance on the part of the bar giving commercial 
advice which I have found in the highest quarters of the land, is a thing which has turned my 
hair-not white, -but taken it out-during the process of discussion of the problems of this 
Commercial Code." Llewellyn, supra note 93, at 781. By 1952, Professor Llewellyn had 
become impatient with those who opposed adoption of the Code because it would change 
the allegedly existing, certain law. Professor George W. Bacon's remarks are illustrative of 
this camp of thought: "I have taught Sales for 28 years. . . . I have asked myself ever since 
the Code has been in the process of drafting, 'why is it needed'. . . . One reason that I have 
read as to why it is needed, and almost the only specific reason that has been given . . . is 
that an airplane can fly from San Francisco to New York in four hours whereas it used to 
take a horse and covered wagon six months, or whatever it was. Just what that has to do 
with where the risk of loss should fall or whether a warranty should run to guests of the 
family or what the seller's duties are on a f.o.b. point of shipment contract is more than I can 
make out. Now, just because we have more speed in the transaction of business and the 
delivery of goods does not seem to me to lead to the idea that we should change all the 
principles of the law that we now have and which are pretty well settled." N.Y. LAW REvi-
SION REPORT 1954, supra note 84, at 129, 144. 
185. Llewellyn, supra note 177, at 382. 
186. USA § 15(2). 
187. See, e.g., Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 116 (1884); Archdale v. 
Moore, 19 ill. 565 (1858); Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552 (1860); Rodgers & Co. v. Niles & 
Co., 11 Ohio St. 48 (1960). 
188. For cases holding that a dealer did not give an implied warranty of merchantabili-
ty, see, e.g., Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383 (1871); Reynolds v. General Elec. 
Co., 141 F. 551 (8th Cir. 1905); Seixas v. Wood, 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804). For cases 
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controversy with section 15(2),I89 believing that the more sensible posi-
tion was that retailers should give an implied warranty of 
merchantability.I90 It was this aspect of section 15(2) which Professor 
Llewellyn praised.I9I 
Professor Llewellyn clearly wanted his section 2-314 merchant to 
include retailers, manufacturers, and growers of goods. He must have 
believed that his original definition, expressed solely in terms of the "by 
his occupation" language, would do so. Others did not interpret sec-
tion 2-104 that way. Professor Waite expressed total confusion about 
the meaning of the definition.I92 He thought its emphasis on knowl-
edge "odd."I93 Musing about section 2-104 in connection with section 
2-314, he discussed a hypothetical storekeeper who sold toilet paper, 
eggs, and pate.I94 Relying on a common sense understanding of the 
word "merchant," he would assume obviously that the country store-
keeper was a merchant.I95 Relying on section 2-104's definition, he 
would conclude "emphatically 'no.' "I96 Professor Waite then asked, 
"Does he, merely because he sells such things, hold himself out as hav-
ing knowledge or skill peculiar to them?" He concluded that, "Now I 
have serious doubt as to what section 2-314 means.''I97 
The possibility that section 2-104 could be misconstrued to exclude 
retailers must have horrified Professor Llewellyn. Professor Waite's ar-
ticle appeared in March 1950. The next revision of the Code, dated 
September 1950, contained the following: "Section 2-104, Line 1: in-
holding that a dealer did give a warranty, see, e.g., Murchie v. Cornell, 155 Mass. 60, 29 
N.E. 207 (1891); Campion v. Marston, 99 Me. 410, 59 A. 548 (1904). 
189. "According to the English law (and also under the American Sales Act) the seller 
impliedly warrants the merchantable character of the goods he sells as fully when he is 
merely a dealer in goods of that description as when he is a manufacturer." S. WILLISTON, 
supra note 60, § 233. According to Professor Gilmore: "Statutes like the Uniform Sales Act 
were not statutes at all. That is, they were not designed to provide rules for decision. 
Drafted in terms ofloose and vague generality, they were designed to provide access to the 
prevailing academic wisdom. The rules for decision in sales cases were to be found, not in 
the Uniform Sales Act which had been drafted by Samuel Williston . . . but in Professor 
Williston's treatise on the law of sales." Gilmore, supra note 67, at 71. Morrow analogized 
the Sales Act to "[t]he Restatements of today, with the sole advantage that they did possess 
legislative sanction." Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 TuL. L. REv. 
327, 338 (1940). 
190. S. WILLISTON, supra note 60, § 233. 
191. See supra note 185 & accompanying text. 
192. Waite, supra note 167, at 618-19. 
193. Id. at 618. 
194. Id. at 619. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
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sert 'who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise'."I9s The drafters 
hastily added the "deals in" language to avert a possible section 2-104 
interpretative disaster. 
The intended meaning of section 2-104's definition, viewed in light 
of these historical considerations, becomes clear. The "deals in" lan-
guage takes on its ordinary meaning of buying and selling, referring to 
retailers and dealers. The "by his occupation" language refers to man-
ufacturers and growers. Section 2-104 thereby encompasses the class of 
sellers covered by section 15(2). Originally, Professor Llewellyn as-
sumed that his "occupation" language would include everybody he 
wanted to include. The "deals in" language was an afterthought, ad-
ded after the drafters thought about Professor Waite's article. But, sec-
tion 2-104's meaning as it applies to section 2-314 is not intuitively 
obvious to those who must interpret it. One court. referred to the prac-
tices aspect of the definition in holding that a manufacturer qualified as 
a merchant for purposes of section 2-314. 199 Maryland just gave up. In 
enacting the Code, Maryland added a sentence to section 2-314 defin-
ing the seller subject to sections 2-314 and 2-318 as "the manufacturer, 
distributor, dealer, wholesaler or other middleman or the retailer."200 
Having identified the class of sellers subject to section 2-314 as all 
those involved in the distribution network with respect to particular 
goods, the fundamental question now becomes: why limit the implied 
warranty of merchantability just to that class? The drafters' wisdom in 
doing so clearly was an inherited wisdom. In fact, section 2-314 merely 
carried on a venerable English tradition older than the USA. Professor 
Williston had modeled the USA on Chalmers' English Sale of Goods 
Act which had been enacted in 1893.201 The English Sale of Goods 
Act, in tum, codified English case law.202 To evaluate section 2-314's 
198. U.C.C. arts. 2, 4, 9 (Sept. 1950 Revision). 
199. ''The term 'practices' indicates that any one may be a merchant of goods by virtue 
of his involvement in the process by which those goods are produced as well as by sale of the 
finished goods from inventory." Blockhead, Inc. v. The Plastic Forming Co., Inc., 402 F. 
Supp. 1017, 1025 (D. Conn. 1975). 
200. Mo. CoM. LAW CooE ANN.§ 2-314 (1975 & Supp. 1982). 
201. Professor Williston acknowledged that he based his sales act on the English Sale of 
Goods Act. Williston, supra note 84, at 563. He argued that the similarity between English 
and American law was a strength, especially in light of international trade, and the Code's 
different treatment and phraseology undermined that. I d. at 564-65. In the area of seller 
responsibility for quality, Professor Williston did not adopt the English distinction between 
conditions and warranties. S. WILLISTON, supra note 60, § 249. Under the English Act, 
breach of warranty only gave rise to a right to damages whereas breach of condition gave 
rise to a right of rescission. Morrow, supra note 189, at 340. The USA's elimination of the 
warranty/condition distinction therefore afforded the buyer greater relief. Id. 
202. ''The English statute was intended to express the common law of England as it 
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merchant distinction, we must consider the historical connection be-
tween seller status and seller responsibility. More than one court has 
observed that it is impossible to reconcile all the cases.203 Despite this, 
the policies that justified imposing quality responsibility on some sell-
ers and not others do emerge. It is with these policy considerations and 
not the complicated history and evolution of the law of warranty it-
self204 that we must be concerned in judging the present validity of sec-
tion 2-314's merchant restriction. 
The Historical Antecedents Connecting Seller Status To Seller 
Responsibility For Quality 
In the beginning, there was caveat emptor-or so eighteenth and 
nineteenth century English and American courts thought.205 Professor 
Hamilton established that, in reality, just the opposite was true,206 but 
that historical reality is ultimately irrelevant. English and American 
courts believed caveat emptor to be the basic rule governing allocation 
of loss between buyer and seller for defective goods. Modem seller 
responsibility for quality evolved from an initial predicate of caveat 
emptor. The law recognized only two exceptions to caveat emptor: 
existed at the time the act was passed." S. WILLISTON, supra note 60, § 248. For a general 
discussion of what the drafters of the English Sale of Goods Act failed to perceive about 
prior English warranty caselaw, see Stoljar, Conditions and Warranties on Sale, 15 Moo. L. 
REV. 425 (1952). The treatment of warranties under both acts largely adopted the classifica-
tions enunciated in Jones v. Just, 3 L.R.Q.B. 197 (1868). See S. WILLISTON, supra note 60, 
§ 229. 
203. See, e.g., Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 115-16 (1883); Hoe v. 
Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552, 555 (1860). 
204. Many scholars have dealt with this difficult topic. See, e.g., S. MILSOM, HISTORI-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 271-78, 317-20 (1969); T. PLUCKNETT, A CoN-
CISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 637-50 (1956); A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT, 164-67, 242-47, 535-36, 556-57 (1975); Ames, History of As-
sumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53 (1889); Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1888). 
Professor Rasor's brief description aptly captures the complexity of the topic: "[T]his article 
will trace the law of warranty from its origin as a tort out of the primordial ooze of action on 
the case, through its capture by assumpsit, its transportation as a hybrid to the United States 
.... its emergence as a contract, and finally its illumination and reappearance as a tort." 
Rasor, supra note 134, at 176. 
Dean Prosser in his own inimitable style characterized the implied warranty as "a freak 
hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract." Prosser, The Assault Upon the 
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960). 
205. See, e.g., Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383 (1870); Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. 
R. 48 (N.Y. 1804); La Neuville v. Norse, 170 Eng. Rep. 1407 (Nisi Prius 1813); Parkinson v. 
Lee, 102 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1802). 
206. Hamilton, supra note 99, at 1136-74. 
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seller fraud and/or the sellers giving of an express warranty.207 If the 
seller was guilty of fraud or gave an express, formal warranty of quality 
with respect to the goods, he assumed the loss for their defects.2os 
Otherwise, the buyer did. These rules did not discriminate upon the 
basis of a seller's status. Caveat emptor and its exceptions uniformly 
governed all sales transactions. 
Scholars have argued that the doctrine embodied the individualis-
tic spirit of the times,2°9 a belief ''that individuals should make their 
own decisions, exercise their own prudence and judgment and ask for a 
warranty if they wanted one."21° Of course, if all courts had embraced 
the doctrine and its underlying premises wholeheartedly, there would 
be no implied warranty today. The United States Supreme Court, 
probably unmindful of the deeper implications, recognized this in Kel-
logg .Bridge Co. v. Hamilton .211 In Kellogg, the seller's attorney had 
argued that the buyer, not the seller, should assume the loss because it 
was always in the buyer's power to exact an express warranty and he 
had failed to do so.212 The Court rejected the argument out of hand: 
"Such an argument impeaches the whole doctrine of implied warranty, 
for there can be no case of a sale . . . in which the buyer may not, if he 
207. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Lee, 102 Eng. Rep. 389, 392 (K.B. 1802); Stuart v. Wilkins, 
99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778). 
208. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Lee, 102 Eng. Rep. 389, 392 (K.B. 1802). Courts assumed 
that Chandelor v. Lopus, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (K.B. 1603), first enunciated the doctrine of caveat 
emptor. See, e.g., Siexas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48, 55 (N.Y. 1804) (Kent, J.). Scholars have 
questioned the true significance of the Cltandelor case, which dealt with the buyer's right of 
recourse against the seller of a bezoar stone (a stone from a goat's intestine) claimed to have 
medicinal qualities. Professor Hamilton argued that the case involved a pleading matter. 
Hamilton, supra note 99, at 1167. Professor Atiyah remarked that "[i]t seems extraordinary 
that this case should have been regarded as laying the foundation of the later law of caveat 
emptor." P. ATIYAH, supra note 96, at 179. He surmised that the court probably was reluc-
tant to value such a strange object or to determine if it was a bezoar stone. I d. He also 
noted that the buyer probably was suing because it did not have the medicinal qualities he 
expected. I d. With respect to that kind of subject matter, arguably it was reasonable to hold 
"that one's unconsidered bargain was his own tough luck." Hamilton, supra note 99, at 
1163. Professor Hamilton describes the origins of caveat emptor as deriving from the non-
organized unregulated trade of "the wayfaring palmer with his relics and trinkets, the peri-
patetic peddlar with gew-gaws and ornaments, strangers here today and there tomorrow, 
wayfaring men of no place and without the law. In such wares one had to trade at his peril; 
there was no authentic test for holy water and bones of the saints, for venetian glass and 
spices of Araby." Id. at 1162-63. A bezoar stone certainly would seem to fall into the same 
class of things as holy water and bones of saints. 
209. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, supra note 96, at 180; Hamilton, supra note 99, at 1176; Kess-
ler, Tlte Protection oftlte Consumer Under Modem Sales Law, Part I, 74 YALE L.J. 262, 266 
(1964). 
210. P. ATIYAH, supra note 96, at 180. 
211. 110 u.s. 108 (1883). 
212. Id. at 118. 
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chooses, insist on an express warranty against latent defects."213 The 
simple fact that some courts did resort to an implied warranty suggests 
that at least some courts were uncomfortable with caveat emptor and 
its allocation of loss to the buyer. 
Courts ill-disposed toward caveat emptor could circumvent the 
doctrine by focusing on its emphasis on the buyer's reliance on his own 
judgment. In 1815, Lord Ellenborough stated that "[w]here there is no 
opportunity to inspect the commodity, the maxim caveat emptor does 
not apply."214 In referring to the buyer's inability to inspect, Lord El-
lenborough managed to acknowledge and dispose of caveat emptor in 
one fell swoop.215 A contractual reasonable expectations approach to 
the question of allocation of loss characterized the rest of his opinion. 
He noted that under the circumstances, "the purchaser has a right to 
expect a salable article answering the description in the contract . . . 
the purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a dung-
hill."216 Although the transaction appeared to be between two 
merchants,217 seller status was not an issue. 
A buyer's inability to inspect provided one way to circumvent the 
doctrine of caveat emptor. The buyer's reasonable reliance on the skill 
and judgment of his seller provided another. If the buyer did not exer-
cise his own skill and judgment, but relied on the seller's skill and judg-
ment, caveat emptor would not apply.218 In this context, the question 
of seller status assumed a pivotal role with respect to seller responsibil-
ity for quality. A finding of buyer reliance on the skill and judgment of 
the seller was a thinly disguised way to reject caveat emptor. New pol-
icy considerations were at work. In Jones v. Bright ,219 a manufacturer 
of copper sheathing sold some to the plaintiff for his ship. The defend-
ant manufacturer knew the buyer's particular purpose. He said to the 
buyer, "I will supply you well."220 The attorney for the plaintiff-buyer 
213. /d. 
214. Gardiner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (K.B. 1815). 
215. Clearly if the buyer has no opportunity to inspect, he cannot be said to have relied 
on his own judgment. If that is impossible, caveat emptor does not apply. 
216. Gardiner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (K.B. 1815). 
217. The subject matter of the sale was 12 bags of waste silk. At the time of contracting, 
the defendant had shown the plaintiff's agent samples of it which he had received in a letter 
from his seller. The waste silk was to be imported from the continent. Upon receipt of the 
silk, the plaintiff found it unfit for sale. All of these facts suggest that the two parties were 
traders. Id. 
218. See, e.g., Jones v. Just, 3 L.R.- Q.B. 187 (1868); Bigge v. Parkinson, 158 Eng. Rep. 
758 (Ex. 1862); Brown v. Edgington, 133 Eng. Rep. 751 (C.P. 1841). 
219. 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (C.P. 1829). 
220. Id. 
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argued that the buyer would not have had any means of knowing 
whether the article to be sold would be fit for his particular purpose 
and therefore could not rely on his own judgment, "but the seller has 
generally the means of knowing this, and of preparing his article ac-
cordingly, more especially where, as in the present case, he is the man-
ufacturer."221 The buyer, he argued, was relying reasonably on the 
seller's skill. Chief Justice Best, in ruling for the buyer, suggested two 
reasons for his decision, one which disposed of caveat emptor and an-
other which justified the application of a different rule. He began his 
opinion:. "[I]t is the duty of the court, in administering the law to lay 
down rules calculated to . . . protect persons who are necessarily igno-
rant of the qualities of a commodity they purchase; and to make it in 
the interest of manufacturers and those who sell, to furnish the best 
article that can be supplied."222 He imposed the loss on the manufac-
turer seller because "it will teach manufacturers that they must not aim 
at underselling each other by producing goods of inferior quality, and 
that the law will protect purchasers who are necessarily ignorant of the 
commodity sold."223 For Chief Justice Best, the seller's status as a 
manufacturer had a dual significance. A manufacturer knew more 
about the goods offered for sale than the purchaser. Therefore, the 
buyer from a manufacturer had reason to rely on the manufacturer's 
skill and expertise rather than on his own judgement and caveat 
emptor would not apply. Second, manufacturers who could control the 
quality of their goods should do so or be responsible for their failure to 
do so.224 
The notion of buyer reliance on the seller's skill and expertise ex-
tended to include sellers who were dealers rather than manufacturers. 
In .Brown v. Edgington,225 the buyer, a wine merchant, needed a crane 
rope to lift wine from his cellar. The seller, a dealer in ropes, under-
took to supply him with a suitable rope. The rope broke while one of 
the plaintiff's servants was hauling a "pipe" of wine to the street.226 
221. /d. at 1169. 
222. /d. at 1171. 
223. /d. at 1173. 
224. Manufactured goods were unlike goods such as horses whose "erratic properties 
... could not be reduced to a standard model. ... " Hamilton, supra note 99, at 1163: 
Professor Llewellyn repeatedly argued for the need to distinguish sales of horses and hays-
tacks from sales of wares in commerce. See, e.g. , Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse 
Sales, 52 HARV. L. REv. 873, 874, 877, 879 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn, First 
Struggle]; Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REv. 725, 728, 732,741 (1939) 
[hereinafter cited as Llewellyn, Across Sales]. 
225. 133 Eng. Rep. 751 (C.P. 1841). 
226. /d. at 752. The plaintiff's description of his loss proves, beyond a doubt, that legal 
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The seller's attorney argued that the seller was not a manufacturer and, 
therefore, did not give an implied warranty.227 Chief Justice Tindall 
observed that if the buyer had relied on the seller's judgment and in-
formed the seller of his purpose, "it seems to me, the transaction carries 
with it an implied warranty, that the thing furnished shall be fit and 
proper for the purpose for which it was designed."228 All three justices 
indicated that the seller's status as a manufacturer was not crucial to 
the finding of an implied warranty.229 Justice Bosanquet went furthest 
in this regard, viewing the sitaation from a contractual perspective: 
"[w]here a contract is, expressly or impliedly, to furnish goods of a par-
ticular description, a warranty is created that they shall be of that 
description. "230 
The notion of reasonable buyer reliance on the seller was a flexible 
judicial device. It could be used to impose the loss on the buyer. If the 
transaction involved two dealers, it was possible to hold that the buyer 
was not relying on the seller's skill and judgment because he had his 
own on which to rely.231 So, too, if the seller was not a dealer or manu-
facturer, he would not have any particular knowledge or skill upon 
which the buyer could be said to have relied.232 Under both those fac-
tual situations some courts held that it was every man for himself. 233 
Not too far from the surface of such cases, however, was the desire to 
avoid imposing the loss on an innocent seller.234 Of course, the court's 
direct act of refusing to impose the loss on an innocent seller had the 
indirect consequence of imposing it on the innocent buyer, but caveat 
emptor saved the day. The buyer was less innocent or "more deserv-
ing" of the loss, having created his own demise by failing to demand an 
prolixity began well before the twentieth century: "[T]he said last-mentioned rope, by rea-
son of its being so bad, unfit and improper for that purpose as aforesaid . . . then gave way 
and broke, and thereby the said pipe of wine fell to the ground, and the said pipe was 
broken, shattered, staved in, and spoilt, and the wine in the said pipe was spilt, scattered, 
spoiled and poured out upon the ground, and thereby became and was wholly lost to the 
plaintiff .... " Id. at 753. 
227. ld. at 753. 
228. Id. at 756. 
229. ld. at 756 (Tindall, C.J., and Bosanquet, J.), 757 (Erskine, J., and Moule, J.). 
230. ld. at 756. 
231. See, e.g., Emmerton v. Matthews, 158 Eng. Rep. 604 (Ex. 1862); Gray v. Cox, 107 
Eng. Rep. 999 (K.B. 1825); Parkinson v. Lee, 102 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1802). 
232. See, e.g., Bumby v. Bollett, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348 (Ex. 1847). 
233. When it was every man for himself, i.e., caveat emptor, the buyer assumed the loss. 
234. With respect to Parkinson v. Lee, Professor Hamilton argued that "[i]t is impossible 
for the reader ... to escape the conclusion that the innocence of the dealer, who was a party 
distinct from the fraudulent grower, was the dominant consideration with the bench." Ham-
ilton, supra note 99, at 1176. 
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express warranty.235 
The 1869 case of Jones v. Just summarized English thinking with 
regard to the connection between seller status and seller responsibility 
for quality.236 The court laced its basic theory of contractual expecta-
tions with noddings to caveat emptor. The subject matter of the sale, 
manilla hemp, was to be delivered to an English buyer from Singapore. 
Clearly the buyer had no opportunity to inspect it, but neither had the 
seller. It arrived in Liverpool damaged by "the perils of the seas and 
navigation,"237 namely, salt-water. At auction, it realized only 75 per-
cent of the price for merchantable hemp.238 In holding for the buyer 
the court said: 
The maxim of caveat emptor cannot apply, and . . . it must be as-
sumed that the buyer and seller both contemplated dealing in an arti-
cle which was merchantable. The buyer bought for the purpose of 
sale, and the seller could not on any other supposition than that the 
article was merchantable have found a customer for his goods, and 
the buyer must be taken to have trusted to the judgment, knowledge 
and information of the seller, as it is clear to us that he could exercise 
no judgment of his own; and this appears to us to be at the root of the 
doctrine of implied warranty.239 
The court's emphasis on the buyer's reliance on the seller's judg-
ment and knowledge must be seen for what it is-a judicial device to 
break from the strictures of caveat emptor. The seller had no more 
knowledge and could exercise no greater judgment with respect to the 
damaged condition of the manila hemp than the buyer. The buyer's 
lack of opportunity to inspect offered the court a convenient route of 
escape from caveat emptor. The court grounded its decision in con-
tract. The buyer and seller were buying and selling on the supposition 
that the manila hemp was merchantable. But for that assumption, 
there would have been no contract. 
In England, the concept of implied warranty arose from the desire 
235. The court in Parkinson v. Lee stated: "I must suppose that each party was equally 
well acquainted with the commodity bargained for. There was no representation made by 
the plaintiff as to the goodness of the hops, to induce him to make the purchase. But here 
was a commodity offered for sale, which might or might not have a latent defect: this was 
well known in the trade; and the plaintiff might if he pleased, have provided against the risk, 
by requiring a special warranty. Instead of which, a sample was fairly taken from the bulk, 
and he exercised his own judgment upon it; and knowing, as he must have known, as a 
dealer in the commodity, that it was subject to a latent defect which afterwards appeared, he 
bought it at his own risk." 102 Eng. Rep. 389, 392 (K..B. 1802). 
236. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 197 (1868). The English Sale of Goods Act codified the holding of 
Jones v. Just. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 207 (emphasis in original). 
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to give legal effect to reasonable contractual expectations and to regu-
late manufacturers. It evolved from a framework of caveat emptor. 
Chief Justice Best's interpretation240 of an old English case, Chandelor 
v. Lopus,241 considered to be the cornerstone of caveat emptor, exem-
plifies the transparency of the judicial reasoning used to break away 
from caveat emptor.242 Choosing to overlook an earlier holding that an 
express warranty was required,243 Chief Justice Best said that 
Chandelor only established "that to render the defendants liable, there 
must be a warranty or a false representation. But the case does not 
decide there must be an express warranty; an implied warranty would 
satisfy the terms of the decision."244 The concept of implied warranty 
was a judicial construct which allowed the court to impose the loss on 
the seller. The seller's status was helpful in avoiding caveat emptor. 
English courts used a seller's status as dealer or manufacturer to 
justify departing from caveat emptor. The doctrine remained to allo-
cate loss between the non-manufacturer/non-dealer seller and buyer. 
The desire to regulate manufacturers and to give effect to contractual 
expectations justified and continue to justify rejection of the doctrine. 
They do not justify retaining it in the area of private sales. 
Most American courts took caveat emptor more seriously than 
their brethren across the Atlantic,245 and as a consequence, the Ameri-
can situation was quite confused.246 Courts held for the seller if the 
240. Jones v. Bright, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (C.P. 1829). 
241. 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (K.B. 1603). 
242. See supra notes 214-30 & accompanying text. 
243. Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778). 
244. Jones v. Bright, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167, 1172 (C.P. 1829). 
245. Professor Hamilton argued that the real triumph of caveat emptor occurred in 
America. Hamilton, supra note 99, at 1178. Professor Atiyah stated that "the doctrine ... 
never seems to have been nearly as rigorously applied in England as is popularly believed 
and certainly not as it was later applied in America." P. ATIYAH, supra note 96, at 180. 
There was a certain irony in all this. In Jones v. Just, Justice Mellor noted that the seller's 
attorney directed the court to consider the authority of Chancellor Kent. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 197, 
206 (1868). In Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804), Chancellor Kent ex-
pressed reservations about caveat emptor but reluctantly applied the doctrine because it 
represented what he thought to be the well-established rule. !d. at 54-55. See supra note 100 
& accompanying text. Justice Mellor rejected the attorney's appeal to the authority of 
Chancellor Kent saying that "as tlie American cases which (Kent] cites are generally adverse 
to his opinion, it can at most be said tliat the opinion of an eminent writer is opposed to the 
authority of the cases he cites. Jones v. Just, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 206. It is not surprising that the 
area of warranty law is confused and confusing. 
246. Several American courts noted tliat it was impossible to reconcile all the cases. See, 
e.g., Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383,390 (1870); Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552 
(1860). Some courts followed strictly tlie dictates of caveat emptor. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. 
Armour & Co., 74 N.J.L. 274,675 A. 883 (1907); Dounce v. Dow, 64 N.Y. 411 (1876). Other 
courts were more sensitive to mercantile needs, political realities and principles of fairness. 
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buyer could have inspected the goods, regardless of the impracticability 
involved in an inspection.247 In addition, the existence of the right to 
inspect caused the buyer to assume the loss even for latent defects un-
discoverable by inspection.248 This reasoning was consistent with a lit-
eral application of caveat emptor because the buyer had the right to 
demand an express warranty if he did not want to assume the risk for 
latent quality defects.249 Slothfulness was not to be rewarded and, 
more importantly, the needs of trade required caveat emptor.2so 
American courts generally agreed that manufacturers impliedly 
warranted the merchantability of their goods,2s1 but courts offered va-
rying explanations. Some courts simply cited English or American pre-
cedent. 252 Other courts felt the need for a rationale more satisfactory 
than stare decisis. An 1860 New York court, casting about for an ex-
planation that would be doctrinally consistent with caveat emptor, pro-
vided a logically impeccable theory.253 It began with the 
uncontroverted exception to caveat emptor that a seller is liable for all 
defects about which he had knowledge,254 and reasoned that a manu-
facturer has intimate knowledge about its goods.255 Because manufac-
turers had such knowledge, there was a great probability that they had 
knowledge of defects in their goods.256 Thus for the court, holding 
manufacturers to give an implied warranty was nothing more than a 
presumption of knowledge about defects.257 The law presumed scien-
ter with respect to manufacturers whereas it required proof of scienter 
See, e.g., Bradford v. Manly, 13 Mass. 138 (1816); Bierman v. City Mills Co. 151 N.Y. 482, 
45 N.E. 856 (1897); Carleton v. Lombard, Ayers & Co., 149 N.Y. 137, 43 N.E. 422 (1896); 
Howard v. Hoey, 23 Wend. 350 (N.Y. 1840). Yet other courts rejected the doctrine out of 
hand. See, e.g., Missroon v. Waldo, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 76 (1819); Barnard v. Yates, 
4 S.C.L. (I Nott & McC.) 142 (1818). 
247. See, e.g., Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383 (1870). But see Boorman & 
Johnston v. Jenkins, 12 Wend. 566 (N.Y. 1834). 
248. Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73, 89 (1851) (''where the goods are equally accessible to 
both and their quality equally unknown there can be neither justice or propriety in implying 
a warranty on the part of the seller against a latent defect"). 
249. Id. at 90. 
250. Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 391 (1870); Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 
73, 89 (1851). 
251. See, e.g., Bierman v. City Mills Co., 151 N.Y. 482, 45 N.E. 856 (1897); Hoe v. 
Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552 (1860); Archdale v. Moore, 19 Ill. 565 (1858). 
252. See, e.g., Strauss v. Salzer, 109 N.Y.S. 734, 58 Misc. 573 (1908); Pascal v. Goldstein, 
100 N.Y.S. 1025, 51 Misc. 629 (1906). 
253. Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552 (1860). 
254. Id. at 555. 
255. Id. at 562. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 562, 566. 
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with respect to all other sellers.258 If the manufacturer could rebut the 
presumption that he should have known of the defect, he would not be 
responsible.259 The court concluded that manufacturers impliedly war-
ranted the quality of their goods because their status indicated special 
knowledge of the goods.260 This explanation fit neatly into the logical 
contours of caveat emptor. 
The United States Supreme Court in 1883 offered a somewhat dif-
ferent explanation for imposing warranty liability on manufacturers. 
Its reasoning had a significant impact on subsequent American think-
ing with respect to seller status and responsibility261 and thus merits 
special attention: 
According to the principles of decided cases, and upon clear grounds 
of justice, the fundamental inquiry must always be whether, under 
the circumstances of the particular case, the buyer had the right to 
rely and necessarily relied on the judgment of the seller and not upon 
his own. In ordinary sales the buyer has an opportunity of inspecting 
the article sold; and the seller not being the maker, and therefore 
having no special or technical knowledge of the mode in which it was 
made, the parties stand upon grounds of substantial equality .... 
But when the seller is the maker or manufacturer of the thing sold, 
the fair presumption is that he understood the process of manufac-
ture, and was cognizant of any latent defect caused by such process 
and against which reasonable diligence might have guarded. This 
presumption is justified, in part, by the fact that the manufacturer or 
maker by his occupation holds himself out as competent to make 
articles reasonably ad~ted to the purposes for which such or similar 
articles are designed.2 
According to the Court, seller status was important because it indi-
cated the seller's degree of knowledge or skill with respect to the goods. 
The degree of seller knowledge or expertise went to the more funda-
mental question of whether the buyer justifiably relied on the seller's 
judgment rather than his own. If it could be established that the buyer 
had a right to rely on the seller's judgment, his rights would not be 
governed by caveat emptor. This reasoning entailed two logical conse-
quences. If the parties had equal skill or knowledge with respect to the 
goods, caveat emptor would apply, causing the loss to fall on the 
buyer.263 So too, if the parties were equally ignorant, caveat emptor 
258. /d. at 555. 
259. /d. at 566. 
260. /d. at 562-63. 
261. See infra notes 263-76 & accompanying text. 
262. Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 116 (1883). 
263. See, e.g., Reed v. Rea-Patterson Milling Co., 186 Ark. 595, 54 S.W.2d 695 (1932); 
Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S.W. 288 (1905); National Cotton Oil Co. v. 
Young, 74 Ark. 144, 85 S.W. 92 (1905). 
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would govern and once again, the loss would fall on the buyer.264 
Emphasis on the seller's skill and knowledge led some courts to 
conclude that dealers and retailers were not responsible for the mer-
chantable quality of their goods.265 Justice Learned Hand reasoned 
that a general dealer would have no special acquaintance with particu-
lar types of goods and therefore, the common law, i.e., caveat emptor, 
would control.266 Another court held that a seller who was not the 
manufacturer would not impliedly warrant the merchantable quality of 
his goods because in that situation, both parties would have equal 
knowledge and, therefore, stand on an equal footing.267 Consequently, 
it could not be said that the buyer was relying on the seller's skill and 
expertise.26B A contract between merchants, a fortiori, would not in-
volve an implied warranty of merchantability.269 
Emphasis on the seller's skill and knowledge led some courts to 
conclude that dealers and retailers were not responsible for the mer-
chantable quality of their goods. Professor Llewellyn intended his sec-
tion 2-104 merchant to include retailers for purposes of section 2-
314.270 His choice of words defining the article 2 merchant, borrowed 
from the text of an 1883 Supreme Court opinion,271 seems most pecu-
liar. He employed words to accomplish a result that the words them-
selves had not produced. Professor Waite's criticism, that section 2-
104's definition would exclude general retailers from its scope,272 was a 
264. See, e.g., Reynolds v. General Elec. Co., 141 F. 551 (8Jh Cir. 1905); Dishman v. 
Griffis, 16 Ala. App. 381, 77 So. 961 (1918); Bigelow v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 110 Me. 105, 
85 A. 396 (1912). 
265. See, e.g., Cole v. Branch & O'Neil, 171 Ark. 611, 285 S.W. 353 (1926); P.D. Belle-
ville Supply Co. v. Dacey, 141 Miss. 569, 106 So. 818 (1926); Hoyt v. Hainsworih Motor Co., 
112 Wash. 440, 192 P. 918 (1920). 
266. McNeil & Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co., 274 F. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
267. Reynolds v. General Elec. Co., 141 F. 551 (8ih Cir. 1905). 
268. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1925); Bellville Supply Co. 
v. Dacey, 141 Miss. 569, 106 So. 818 (1926); Aronowitz v. F.W. Woolworih Co., 134 Misc. 
272, 236 N.Y.S. 133 (1929). 
269. See, e.g., Reed v. Rea-Patterson Milling Co., 186 Ark. 595, 54 S.W.2d 695 (1932); 
Cole v. Branch & O'Neal, 171 Ark. 611, 285 S.W. 353 (1926). The Mississippi Supreme 
Court recognized an implied warranty only if !he seller knew of !he buyer's reliance on him. 
P.D. Bellville Supply Co. v. Dacey, 141 Miss. 569, 573, 106 So. 818, 819 (1926). It therefore 
limited !he implied warranty to manufacturers because only manufacturers would know of 
buyer reliance on !heir expertise. See id. A 1920 Washington court refused to find !hat a car 
dealer had given an implied warranty because boih !he car dealer and buyer were relying on 
!he skill and expertise of the car manufacturer. Hoyt v. Hainsworih Motor Co., 112 Wash. 
440, 192 P. 918 (1920). 
270. See supra notes 167-91 & accompanying text. 
271. Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 116 (1883). 
272. Waite, supra note 167, at 619. See supra notes 192-98 & accompanying text. 
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case law reality!273 Why Professor Llewellyn, conversant with the case 
law,274 chose the words he did is extremely puzzling. Perhaps he be-
lieved that subsequent decisions, grounding the implied warranty of 
merchantability on a broader theory of reasonable public expecta-
tions,275 negated prior decisions. However, at least some courts decid-
ing cases under the Code have taken section 2-104literally, refusing to 
accord merchant status to op.e not manufacturing goods or holding 
himself out as having special knowledge or expertise with respect to the 
goods.276 
Section 15(2) of the USA attempted to resolve the controversy sur-
rounding whether a dealer gave an implied warranty of merchantabili-
ty by imposing warranty liability on all sellers dealing in goods of the 
kind.277 Courts interpreted this to mean that retailers as well as manu-
facturers gave implied warranties,278 although they offered different ex-
planations to justify this imposition. Sometimes the rationale was 
articulated in terms of a reasonable reliance theory. For instance, a 
customer selecting canned goods on a store shelf "is ordinarily bound 
to rely upon the skill and experience of the seller in determining the 
kind of canned goods which he will purchase."279 Arguing against 
such liability for retailers, Professor Waite pointed out the fictional na-
ture of this kind of reasoning.280 Professor Waite believed that buyers 
could not reasonably rely on the seller's skill and judgment with respect 
to canned goods.281 He maintained that retailers should be liable only 
if they were at fault.282 The seller of canned or packaged goods has no 
more knowledge or skill with respect to the goods than the buyer be-
cause neither party has actual access to the goods inside the packaging. 
At most, the buyer can assume that the seller's sale intimates the seller's 
273. See supra notes 265-69 & accompanying text. 
274. Professor Llewellyn's articles parsed decisions and scrutinized judges. See gener-
ally, Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699 (1936); Llew-
ellyn, supra note 177. 
275. See, e.g., Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 
(1938); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942). 
276. See, e.g., All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177 (1975) (lease 
transaction); All-States Leasing v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899 (1979) (security 
transaction). 
277. See supra notes 265-69 & accompanying text. 
278. See, e.g., Smith v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 170 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1948); Young 
v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 15 F. Supp. 1018 (W.D. Pa. 1936); Dubin v. Denham, 106 Or. 
34, 210 P. 165 (1922). 
279. Ward v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 91, 120 N.E. 225,226 (1918). 
280. Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 MICH. L. REV. 494 ( 1936). 
281. /d. at 501-03. 
282. /d. at 520. 
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belief that the goods are wholesome. 283 
Professor Waite's arguments exposed the transparency of a reason-
able reliance theory to impose warranty liability on retailers. Some 
courts talked about the public's general confidence and reliance on re-
tailers, 284 but the link between seller status and seller responsibility 
more and more resembled a link forged from public policy. One court 
noted that if the buyer's damages award was to be upheld, it had to be 
on some basis other than reliance.285 It justified the retailer's liability 
because such liability was "one of the hazards of business."286 Another 
court observed, "practically he must know if it is fit or take the conse-
quences, if it proves destructive."287 In the area of food, courts justified 
dealer warranty liability on the basis of public safety.288 One court ex-
pressed impatience with judicial emphasis on the buyer's reasonable 
reliance.289 In holding a manufacturer of contaminated sausage liable 
for the death of a child and illness in the rest of the family, the court 
stated that "[t]his implied warranty was not based on any reliance by 
the buyer upon the representations of the seller, or upon his skill and 
judgment, but was grounded squarely upon the public policy of pro-
tecting the public health."29o 
Another court explained how retailer warranty responsibility ulti-
mately protected the public.291 The retailer was in a better position to 
know and ascertain the reliability and responsibility of a manufac-
turer.292 He should be motivated to exercise prudence and caution with 
respect to his suppliers.293 Furthermore, the retailer was better able to 
protect himself as well as better equipped to recoup any loss from the 
person (his supplier) who actually caused the loss.294 Considerations of 
who was better able to avoid the loss, to assume the loss, to spread the 
283. I d. at 501-03. Professor Waite objected to "an obvious imposition of liability with-
out fault, without assumption, and without justification in public good." I d. 
284. See, e.g., Higbee v. Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 
1952); Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949); Griggs Canning Co. v. 
Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W. 2d 835 (1942). 
285. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 391, 175 N.E. 105, 106 (1931) 
(Cardozo, J.). 
286. Id. at 392, 175 N.E. at 106. 
287. Parks v. G.C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 337, 144 P. 202, 203 (1914). 
288. See, e.g., Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1887); Hoover v. Peters, 18 
Mich. 51 (1869); Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942). 
289. Jacob E. Kecker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). 
290. Id. at 616, 164 S.W.2d at 831. 
291. Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942). 
292. Id. at 630, 164 S.W.2d at 838. 
293. Id. at 633, 164 S.W.2d at 840. 
294. Id. For similar arguments, see Ward v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 
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loss or to pass it back to its source became part of the judicial con-
sciousness with respect to implying the warranty of merchantability. 
Factored into all of this was a desire to police the marketplace. 295 
By the time Professor Llewellyn began drafting his version of the 
implied warranty of merchantability, many courts understood that the 
implied warranty was a tool of public policy.296 Presumably the public 
policy considerations which gave rise to the warranty also gave rise to 
section 2-314's merchant restriction. Those considerations must be 
considered in evaluating the validity of section 2-314's merchant 
distinction. 
Section 2-314's Merchant Distinction From The Perspective Of 
Public Policy And Civil Law 
Professor Llewellyn observed that "[w]arranty is a civil obligation. 
Its purpose, like that of any civil obligation, is at once to police, to 
prevent and to remedy."297 Presumably then, Professor Llewellyn 
drafted section 2-314 to police, prevent and remedy the sale of un-
merchantable goods. Section 2-314 polices the merchant seller by mak-
ing him liable for unmerchantable goods. It prevents the merchant 
seller from selling unmerchantable goods by threatening section 2-314 
liability and it provides a remedy by authorizing buyer recourse against 
the seller in the event the goods are unmerchantable. Section 2-314's 
merchant restriction, however, prevents section 2-314 from policing, 
preventing, or remedying the non-merchant seller's sale of un-
merchantable goods. In fact, it does quite the opposite. By limiting 
section 2-314's applicability to merchant sellers, it impliedly sanctions 
the non-merchant seller's sale of unmerchantable goods. Such sellers 
have no quality responsibility and their buyers are left with no alterna-
tive but to pay the purchase price even when the goods tum out to be 
120 N.E. 225 (1918); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 
(1942). 
295. Some courts viewed the implied warranty as a policing device. Imposition of liabil-
ity on the retailer would cause the retailer to sue the manufacturer or supplier, thereby 
placing the loss on the party responsible for it. See, e.g., Ward v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 
231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 
N.E. 105 (1931); Swift v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959). 
296. See, e.g., Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W. 2d 53 (Mo. App. 1955); 
Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, 
Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). Whether it should be used as a public 
policy tool sparked a lively debate between Professors Waite and Brown. Waite, supra note 
280; Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products, 23 MINN. L. REv. 
585 (1939); Waite, Retail Responsibility-A Reply, 23 MINN. L. REV. 612 (1939). 
297. Llewellyn, supra note 274, at 712. 
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worthless. The public policy considerations underlying the creation of 
an implied warranty of merchantability do not explain section 2-314's 
merchant restriction. Holding all sellers responsible for merchantable 
quality would not undermine in any way the warranty goals of polic-
ing, preventing, and remedy. It would promote them. 
At this point, one must doubt the rationality of the restriction. The 
store of potential sources of enlightenment seems exhausted. If section 
2-314 seeks to capture and enforce the reasonable expectations of the 
contracting parties, section 2-314's merchant restriction thwarts that 
goal in non-merchant sales. If the Code's overall warranty goal is to 
determine what, in essence, the seller has agreed to sell, section 2-
314(1) prevents realization of that goal in non-merchant sales. The 
Code's merchant definition, suggesting that responsibility for quality is 
tied to expectations aroused by status, is undercut by section 2-314 and 
its comments excluding isolated sales. An interpretation of section 2-
314 as a public policy tool does not explain its merchant restriction 
because imposition of responsibility on all sellers would not undermine 
any of the policies discussed. Finally, the historical connection be-
tween seller status and seller responsibility merely establishes that 
seller status assisted judicial circumvention of the doctrine of caveat 
emptor. It does not explain why that doctrine continues to govern non-
merchant sales. 
One possible explanation remains. Occasionally, courts have ob-
served that the implied warranty of merchantability is a hazard of busi-
ness, a peril to those engaged in selling for pro.fit.298 Of course, most 
sellers sell to make a profit. Moreover, the mere fact of being in busi-
ness does not establish merchant status for purposes of section 2-314. 
A bank is a business, but it does not give a section 2-314 warranty when 
it sells a repossessed car299 or boat.300 In fact, any businessperson mak-
ing an isolated sale does not give a section 2-314 warranty.3°1 Only 
those in the business of selling goods of the kind involved in the trans-
action give a section 2-314 warranty. Thus, section 2-314 liability cre-
ates a limited, rather than a general, business hazard. 
The limited scope of the ''warranty hazard" provides a clue as to 
298. See, e.g., Young v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 15 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (W.D. Pa. 
1936); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 392, 175 N.E. 105, 106 (1931). 
299. Joyce v. Combank/Longwood, 405 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
300. Donald v. City Nat'l Bank of Dothan, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So. 2d 92 (1976). 
301. U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 3. See, e.g., Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice 
Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522 (D.C. 1971); Siemen v. Alden, 34 Ill. App. 3d 961, 341 N.E.2d 713 
(1975); Brescia v. Great Road Realty Trust, 117 N.H. 154, 373 A.2d 1310 (1977); see also 
notes 156-60 & accompanying text. 
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why only merchant sellers give an implied warranty of merchantability. 
Those in the business of selling goods of the kind are those most likely 
to insure against liability in the event they prove defective. The 
probability of insurance makes them good candidates to assume the 
loss.302 But even this reasoning does not rationalize fully section 2-
314's imposition of liability on merchant sellers. The business buyer is 
in an equal position to insure against loss, but the merchant seller still 
assumes the loss under section 2-314. At least in part, this must be 
because his goods caused the loss.303 A seller in the business of selling 
302. With respect to merchant sellers, the U.C.C. allocates risk of loss or damage on the 
basis of likelihood of insurance. If the merchant seller is to make delivery at his place of 
business, the risk of loss for goods remains on him until physical delivery of the goods. 
U.C.C. § 2-509(3). The comments justify this allocation of the risk of loss explaining that 
the merchant seller "continues meanwhile to control the goods and can be expected to insure 
his interest in them. The buyer, on the other hand, has no control over the goods and it is 
extremely unlikely that he will carry insurance on goods not yet in his possession." Id. 
comment 3. Section 2-509 governs in a non-breach situation. If the buyer is in breach, he 
must assume the loss to the extent of any deficiency in the seller's insurance. I d.§ 2-510(3). 
For purposes of § 2-509(3), the merchant is defined broadly to include both "practices" 
merchants and "goods" merchants. Id. § 2-104 comment 2. In defining the § 2-509(3) 
merchant so broadly, the drafters obviously intended to impose the loss on the candidate 
most reasonably able to assume the loss without real loss, i.e. , the party who could and 
reasonably should insure. Arguably, all sellers in possession of goods, whether they are 
merchants or not, continue to control the goods and reasonably should be expected to insure 
the goods. This prompted Professors Farnsworth and Honnold to ask: "Would it be too 
brutal to simplify this provision to provide that (apart from breach) risk remains with the 
seller (merchant or otherwise) until the buyer receives the goods?" E. FARNSWORTH & J. 
HoNNOLD, supra note 17, at 507. 
303. Imposing the loss on the party ultimately responsible for it comports with the policy 
underlying§ 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts which imposes strict liability on any 
seller who engages in the business of selling a product if the product sold is in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to any user or consumer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 402A(l)(a). The comments to§ 402A indicate that sellers who market products for 
use assume a special responsibility toward the consuming public, that the public has a right 
to expect that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods, and that "public policy de-
mands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption 
be placed on those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which 
liability insurance can be obtained .... " I d. comment c. A concern for shifting the loss to 
the party responsible for it is echoed in some§ 2-314 cases. In Vlases v. Montgomery Ward, 
377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967), the court said "the entire purpose behind the implied warranty 
sections of the Code is to hold the seller responsible when inferior goods are passed along to 
an unsuspecting buyer." I d. at 850. See also Safeway Stores v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 
3326 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Pierce v. Liberty Furniture Co., 146 Ga. App. 175, 233 
S.E.2d 33 (1977). Section 402A does not apply to the isolated or occasional seller. Accord-
ing to the comments, it adopts a position analogous to§ 15(2) of the USA and§ 2-314 of the 
Code: "The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety of 
the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of supplying human beings with 
products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reli-
ance upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods." RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment f. Section 402A imposes consequential liability on 
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goods of the kind also has the opportunity to pass on the loss for defec-
tive goods through price adjustments.304 In addition to being responsi-
ble for the loss, he is the superior loss bearer and as such, section 2-314 
imposes the loss on him unless the parties have agreed otherwise. 
Section 2-314's allocation ofloss to the merchant seller because he 
is the superior loss bearer of the two makes sense as a modem, enlight-
ened, and reasonable loss allocation.305 It is the non-merchant seller 
aspect of section 2-314 that is outmoded, unenlightened and unreason-
able.306 A principle of loss allocation imposing the loss on the party 
best able to bear it is singularly unhelpful when both parties to the 
transaction are equally unprepared or ill-equipped to assume it. The 
reasoning underlying loss allocation to the merchant seller has little 
relevance to loss allocation in non-merchant sales. If there is no supe-
rior loss bearer, some other prj.nciple must be used. Apparently, for 
want of anything better, the drafters relegated non-merchant sales to 
the dictates of caveat emptor. 
In all fairness, the drafters may have been concerned with impos-
ing onerous liability on sellers unprepared and ill-equipped to assume 
it. But refusing to impose the loss on such sellers entails the inevitable 
consequence of imposing it on their buyers, equally unprepared and ill-
equipped to suffer it. Furthermore, a reluctance to impose consequent-
ial liability on non-merchant sellers does not justify the denial of any 
legal recourse at all for their buyers. In many breach of warranty cases, 
consequential liability is not an issue; rather, the buyer simply wants 
his money back or does not want to pay the purchase price.307 Section 
certain sellers for personal injury and property loss caused by their products. Section 2-314 
does not relate just to consequential liability. It governs seller responsibility of any kind. Its 
merchant limitation precludes any§ 2-314 recourse at all to the b'lyer from a non-merchant 
seller. It is this aspect of §2-314's merchant restriction which is objectionable and 
nonsensical. 
304. Those who can take into account in the price the cost of liability without fault are 
superior risk bearers. C. MORRIS & C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 234 (2d ed. 1980). 
305. It is to be distinguished from caveat emptor which indiscriminately imposed the 
loss on the buyer who failed to elicit an express warranty. 
306. Some would argue that§ 2-314's limitation to merchant sellers is modem and rea-
sonable because a non-merchant sale does not involve a superior risk-bearing party. The 
loss should be shifted only from an inferior to a superior risk bearer. C. MoRRIS & C. 
MORRIS, supra note 304, at 233. This rule would save the expenses involved in shifting the 
losses. Id. If the buyer's remedy against a non-merchant seller were limited to a refund on 
the purchase price or an abatement therein, the seller's "loss" would be limited to the 
purchase price. It is fair and reasonable to shift this loss to the seller. In many instances, the 
rule itself would cause the seller to refund or abate without the need for a lawsuit and its 
attendant expenses in much the same way that§ 2-314 now undoubtedly precludes many 
buyers from suing their non-merchant sellers. 
307. See, e.g., Holmes Packaging Mach. Corp. v. Bingham, 252 Cal. App. 2d 862, 60 
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2-314 could make sellers uniformly responsible for the merchantable 
quality of their goods, but limit the non-merchant seller's responsibility 
to a return of or an abatement in the purchase price. In this way, the 
reasonable quality expectations of all buyers would receive some de-
gree of legal protection, but non-merchant sellers would not be saddled 
with consequential liability. 
Seller responsibility for quality without regard to status may be 
novel in American law but it is a concept as old as Roman law.308 Sev-
Cal. Rptr. 769 (1967) (lessee attempted to defend against rental owing by asserting breach of 
warranty); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976) 
(buyer sought rescission of contract). 
308. As in other areas of the law, the Roman law of implied warranty for latent defects 
developed over centuries and from different sources until its final codification under the 
Emperor Justinian in 529 A.D. See A. SCHILLER, ROMAN LAW 210-68 (1978); B. NICHOLAS, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 1-41 {1962). The early civil law (ius civile) recognized 
such a warranty only when the buyer's ignorance of the defect could be ascribed to the 
seller's breach of his obligation to act in good faith, an obligation Roman law imposed on 
both parties to a contract regardless pf their willingness to bargain it away. W. WARMELO, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN CIVIL LAW 175, 176-78 (1978). See a/so 
B. NICHOLAS, supra, at 181. The ius civile implied a warranty against latent defects on the 
seller when buyer's ignorance of the defect resulted from either the seller's willful conceal-
ment (do/us-generally translated as fraud) of the defect or the seller's negligence (culpa) in 
not knowing of the defect before he sold the goods. B. NICHOLAS, supra, at 170, 176; W. 
W ARMELO, supra, at 177. If the buyer could establish either dolus or culpa, he could avail 
himself of the buyer's general contractual remedy of actio empti which entitled him not only 
to general damages (damnum emergens) but also consequential damages (lucrum cessans), 
including lost profits. W. WARMELO, supra, at 179-80, 219. Absent dolus or culpa, the ius 
civile excused the seller from liability unless he gave an express warranty. B. NICHOLAS, 
supra, at 181; W. WARMELO, supra, at 179-80. 
Faced with the ius civile's relative bias toward sellers, Roman administrative practice 
developed greater protection for buyers, especially in the sale of slaves and livestock. B. 
NICHOLAS, supra, at 180-81; W. WARMELO,supra, at 179-80. In the complex structure of the 
Roman system of government, the Curile Aediles supervised the open markets of Rome, 
including the slave markets. A. ScHILLER, supra, at 185-86; W. W ARMELO, supra, at 5. The 
Aediles required all slave dealers to warrant specifically that their slaves had no physical or 
mental defects, no tendency to run away, etc. B. NICHOLAS, supra, at 23, 181; W. WARMELO, 
supra, at 178. If a dealer sold a slave without disclosing any of the defects, the buyer was 
entitled to a choice between two remedies: rescission (actio redhibitoria) within two months 
of purchase or diminution in price (actio quanti minoris) to the actual value of the slave 
within six months of purchase. B. NICHOLAS, supra, at 181; W. WARMELO, supra, at 178. 
These "aedilictian remedies" were soon extended to animals and the statutes of limitation 
for bringing the actions were raised to six months and a year respectively. W. WARMELO, 
supra, at 178-79. Over the years the remedies were extended to ever-widening classes of 
goods and finally, in the Code of Justinian, to all sales. B. NICHOLAS, supra, at 181-82; W. 
WARMELO,supra, at 179-80. Justinian's Code also kept the remedy of actio empti for buyers 
who could show dolus or culpa on the part of the seller. B. NICHOLAS, supra, at 181-82; W. 
WARMELO, supra, at 180. The combination of these remedies meant that Roman law, in the 
form received centuries later by most of continental Western Europe, imposed strict liability 
against latent defects on all sellers, even those innocent of knowledge of the existence of the 
defects. 
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eral modem legal systems have retained the basic Roman approach. 309 
Both the German and French approaches are instructive in this regard 
and provide concrete proof that universal seller responsibility for quali-
ty will not cause the collapse of modem civilization as we know it.3Io 
Germany has two separate codes, a commercial code which gov-
erns merchant transactions311 and a civil code312 which governs all 
other transactions and all issues upon which the commercial code is 
309. Even cursory examination of the codes ofltaly, France, and West Germany reveals 
the continuing influence of Roman theories of warranty liability. The Italian and German 
codes best typify the survival of the Roman law of sales. Articles 1490-1497 of the Italian 
Civil Code (Codice civile- C.c.) set forth the basic law of warranty. A seller warrants the 
goods he sells to be free of defects which either make the goods unfit for their intended use 
or materially diminish their value; the seller may disclaim this warranty only if he discloses 
the existence of these defects to the buyer. C.c. art. 1490. This warranty applies only if the 
defect is unknown to the buyer or could not reasonably have been discovered by him. I d. 
art. 1491. In case of breach of a seller's article 1490 responsibility, the buyer may choose 
between rescission or reduction in price. Id. art. 1492. Consequential damages also are 
available to the buyer unless the seller can prove that he neither knew nor should have 
known of the defect. I d. art. 1494. 
Sections 459-493 of the West German Civil Code (BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch) deal with 
warranties. Although the German code is more explicit and detailed than the Italian code, it 
follows the same pattern. A German seller warrants the goods he sells against defects im-
pairing the value of their fitness for their ordinary or intended use. BGB § 459. Absent an 
express warranty, the seller is not liable for defects of which the buyer knew or which he 
failed to discover due to his own gross negligence. I d. § 460. The normal remedies for 
breach of the warranty are rescission (Wandelung) or the right to demand a reduction in the 
price (Minderung). I d.§ 462. Under limited circumstances, an aggrieved buyer may waive 
his aedilician remedies and sue instead for damages, including consequential damages. I d. 
§ 463. The exceptions include the absence of a quality specifically warranted by the seller, 
as well as fraudulent concealment of a defect. I d. 
The French Civil Code (Code Civil) deals with a seller's warranty in articles 1641-49. 
A French seller warrants his goods against hidden defects which make the goods unsuitable 
for their intended use or which so diminish this use that the buyer either would not have 
purchased the goods or would have paid less for them had he known of the defects. C. CIV. 
art. 1641. A seller has no liability for obvious defects which the buyer could have discov-
ered. Id. art. 1642. As in Italy and Germany, a disappointed buyer may choose between 
rescission and recovery of part of the purchase price. I d. art. 1644. A seller who knew of the 
defect, but concealed its existence, is liable for both restitution of the price of the goods and 
for consequential damages. I d. art. 1645. A seller is liable for defects of which he was 
ignorant, even if those defects were undiscoverable, unless he disclaims his liability for hid-
den defects in good faith. Id. art. 1643. 
310. In Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552 (1860), Judge Selden intimated that caveat emptor 
arose to meet commercial needs among a highly commercial people. I d. at 558. "No doubt 
the common law rule [as opposed to the civil law approach] is, upon the whole, wisest and 
best adapted to an advanced state of society." I d. Morrow argues that it was Rome's ad-
vanced commercial society that produced its scheme of seller responsibility. Morrow, supra 
note 189, at 348-52. 
311. Handelsgesetzbuch. 
312. BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
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silent.3I3 Interestingly enough, the seller's basic responsibility for qual-
ity is governed by the civil code.3I4 
The German buyer has two generally available remedies for 
breach of the seller's warranty: the right to cancel the contract 
(Wande!ung) or the right to demand a reduction in the purchase price 
(Minderung) to reflect the deficiency in value.3I5 Under the German 
system, then, all sellers warrant the quality of their goods, but normally 
the buyer's remedy is limited to a reduction in or return of the purchase 
price. The German approach gives all buyers some recourse for disap-
pointed quality expectations. 
The French approach also authorizes these so-called "aedilictian 
remedies" derived from Roman law.3I6 Additionally, the French au-
thorize consequential damages when the seller is guilty of fraud, 
whether it be an active misreprsentation or concealment.3I7 Through 
case law, the French have established an irrebuttable presumption of 
fraud if the seller is a merchant.3I8 Thus, the French and American 
approaches converge with respect to the merchant seller's responsibility 
for quality. Under both, the merchant seller is liable for consequential 
losses. The French and American positions are at opposite poles, how-
ever, with respect to the non-merchant seller's quality responsibility. 
313. The focus of the German Commercial Code is on the additional rights, duties, and 
obligations of those who have the legal status of merchant (kaufman) and who engage in 
commercial transactions (handelsgeschafle ). The Handelsgesetzbuch applies special rules to 
merchants acting in their mercantile capacity, rules which in general hold merchants to 
higher standards of duty and care than the BOB applies to non-merchants. See, e.g., N. 
HORN, H. KOTZ & H. LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 21-39 (1982). Pro-
fessor Llewellyn's German legal training obviously influenced his drafting of article 2, espe-
cially its special merchant rules, which impose greater responsibility on merchants. 
In Germany, as in other civil law countries, merchant status also includes certain tech-
nical requirements, such as entry into the commercial register, certain bookkeeping formali-
ties, as well as detailed rules concerning the "Commercial N arne" (Firma). H G B 1-7, §§ 17-
30. 
314. The commercial code imposes several important obligations on merchant buyers 
who allege a breach of the civil code warranty. In transactions where both parties are 
merchants, the buyer forfeits his remedies under the civil code if he fails promptly to inspect 
the goods and inform the seller of defects. HOB § 377. The buyer's duty to inspect and 
notify also applies if the goods are non-conforming rather than actually defective. /d. § 378. 
Between merchants, non-conforming goods are deemed accepted in the absence of timely 
notice to the seller unless the goods differ so substantially from contract specifications that 
the seller could not reasonably have expected the buyer to accept them. ld. 
315. BOB § 462. See supra note 309. 
316. C. CIV. art. 1644. · 
317. /d.art.1645. 
318. Kessler, supra note 209, at 277 (citing 10 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE 
DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS NO 134 (2d ed. 1956)); Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative 
Survey, Part II, 14 TuL. L. REV. 529, 535 (1940). 
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The French and German approaches codify the basic civil law 
maxim that "a sound price warrants a sound commodity."319 They 
shield non-merchant sellers from consequential liability if the defect is 
unknown, but still provide some measure of protection for the buyer's 
contractual expectations. Their approach is more consonant with 
American contract principles and considerations of fairness in the ex-
change. They authorize rescission in the event contractual expectations 
are not met. 
Professor Llewellyn was trained in civil law and taught law in 
Germany for two brief periods.320 He must have been familiar with the 
basic civil law approach to warranty. One wonders why he did not 
borrow their approach when he drafted section 2-314. Perhaps it was a 
question of Code politics and political realities. He may have thought 
that public acceptance of the Code required a fundamentally conserva-
tive approach and that the civil law approach to warranty obligations 
was a radical concept. The controversy generated by article 2's 
merchant concept, itself borrowed from the civilians, indicates a basic 
American hostility to things new or different. Perhaps section 2-314's 
compromise represented a considered political decision. For whatever 
reasons, section 2-314(1) superimposes new public policy considera-
tions upon an old foundation of caveat emptor. Section 2-314's 
merchant restriction enshrines caveat emptor as the fundamental prin-
ciple of loss allocation in American non-merchant sales law. 
Conclusion 
As a reasoned way to allocate loss between buyer and seller, caveat 
emptor never had much to recommend it and has less so now in an age 
in which the spirit of individualism has faded. Eliminating section 2-
314's merchant restriction will assure buyers of their basi<!: bargains by 
allowing rescission of "bargains" they never made. Imposing at least 
minimal quality responsibility on all sellers will make section 2-314 
consistent with itself and with the Code's broader warranty scheme. 
More importantly, it will make section 2-314 consistent with modem 
notions of fairness in the individual exchange. There is no reason to 
retain section 2-314's merchant distinction and every reason to abolish 
it. Seller status may be relevant to the question of the degree of seller 
responsibility for quality, but it should be irrelevant to the question of 
basic seller responsibility for contractual expectations. If merchant 
319. See supra note 309. 
320. B. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, supra note 67, at 6. 
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sellers are to assume greater responsibility for quality than non-
merchant sellers in terms of consequential liability, that distinction 
should be incorporated into the Code's remedial provisions. Section 2-
314's merchant restriction perpetuates the ancient doctrine of caveat 
emptor in non-merchant sales. In doing so, it represents an aberration 
under an American sales law which has otherwise wholly rejected the 
doctrine. The merchant of section 2-314, caveat emptor's only remain-
ing protagonist, should perish as well. 
